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The speed at which money moves between people and businesses in the 
United States lags well behind international standards. Slow payment speeds 
lead to inefficiency across the economy, drive demand for high-cost credit 
products, and have hampered the federal response to 2020’s pandemic-driven 
economic crisis. To speed up the payment system, the Federal Reserve (“Fed”) 
has announced its intention to build “FedNow,” a publicly operated, real-time 
payment platform, which would compete with a privately run platform in the 
interbank payment market. Critics claim that the Fed’s plan represents a 
historically unprecedented—and possibly illegal—encroachment on turf that 
properly belongs to the private sector. Against the Fed’s critics, we argue that 
the FedNow plan holds the capacity to achieve three objectives at the heart of 
payment policy in the United States: to catalyze innovation, enhance access to 
developing payment networks, and shore up financial stability. We also argue 
for expanded use of alternative Fed tools to achieve payment objectives. We 
show how the Fed can harmonize its activities as operator, market participant, 
supervisor, and regulator of the payment system to press system development 
forward. More broadly, we argue that the Fed’s multiple roles are not 
troublesome bugs or unfortunate byproducts of political compromise, but 
rather are valuable features that afford the Fed a range of creative tools to 
motivate development and adoption of faster payment platforms in the United 
States. 
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Introduction 
The speed at which money moves through the complex institutional 
circuitry known as the payment system matters greatly.1 Among people who 
live paycheck to paycheck, even a day’s delay in payment speed can produce 
dire consequences.2 A late rental payment triggers fees and risks eviction,3 and 
 
1. We describe the basics of this circuitry infra Part I. 
2. As Mehrsa Baradaran has written, “[w]ithout a financial cushion, every mistake, 
unexpected problem, or minor life change can quickly turn into a financial disaster.” MEHRSA 
BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO 
DEMOCRACY 138 (2015). For evidence that a single day of delay in money-transmission matters to those 
at the economic fringe, see Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 
82 VA. L. REV. 181, 249 n.179 (1996) (describing people who possess bank accounts but nevertheless 
pay for check-cashing services to avoid the “hold[]” period before deposited funds are available for 
withdrawal); and Ronald Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 862 (2006) 
(describing demand for weekend check-cashing services); see also Aaron Klein, The Fastest Way to 
Address Income Inequality? Implement a Real-Time Payment System, BROOKINGS (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-fastest-way-to-address-income-inequality-implement-a-real-
time-payment-system [https://perma.cc/L4RW-7QAZ] (estimating the extent to which demand for short-
term consumer financial products is driven by payment delays); infra Section II.B (discussing evidence 
of timing-driven demand for costly financial services). 
3. See MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 154, 
358 n.3 (2016) (describing the spiraling consequences of late rent payment). 
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a missed payment for insulin risks even death.4 Slow payment speeds thus are 
not merely inconveniences. As lawmakers, regulators, and scholars alike 
acknowledge—and as the slovenly disbursement of welfare payments to nearly 
fifty million Americans during the 2020 coronavirus crisis has recently 
demonstrated—they present a serious policy problem.5 This Article examines 
the potential roles that the Federal Reserve (Fed)6 might play in response. 
Fed experimentation with these potential roles is ongoing and 
controversial. Most prominently, in August 2019, the Fed proposed to do 
something it has not done in over forty years—build and operate an entirely 
new payment platform.7 If built, the platform—called “FedNow”—would be 
designed to hasten the adoption of new, faster payment methods not only 
among banks, but also among individuals and corporations.8 It would function 
as a public option—a government program that “provides an important service 
at a reasonable cost” and “coexists . . . with one or more private options 
 
4. Cf. MICHAEL S. BARR, NO SLACK: THE FINANCIAL LIVES OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 5 
(2012) (describing how living paycheck to paycheck leaves people “vulnerable to medical or job 
emergencies that may endanger financial stability”); Alli Knothe, Are Payday Lenders Like Tampa-
Based Amscot a Necessary Part of the Banking Industry?, TAMPA BAY TIMES (July 23, 2016), 
https://www.tampabay.com/news/business/are-payday-lenders-like-tampa-based-amscot-a-necessary-
part-of-the-banking/2286447 [https://perma.cc/W74F-37Q5] (describing a payday loan taken out to 
cover immediate insulin costs). 
5. See Yonatan Arbel, Payday, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (examining the costs 
of current payment practices and advocating for legislative solutions); Aaron Klein, 70 Million People 
Can’t Afford to Wait for Their Stimulus Funds to in a Paper Check, BROOKINGS (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/70-million-people-cant-afford-to-wait-months-for-their-stimulus-
to-come-in-a-paper-check [https://perma.cc/2TVJ-6V4Y] (estimating that over 48 million Americans 
would receive crisis-related welfare disbursements as paper checks); Zachary Warmbrodt & Victoria 
Guida, Jerome Powell: Fed ‘Seriously Considering’ Faster Payments System, POLITICO (July 31, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/31/powell-fed-faster-payments-system-1629984 
[https://perma.cc/3LWX-KVE9] (describing the view of Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell); 
Austin Weinstein, Elizabeth Warren Wants to Stop Banks from Dominating Trillions in Payments, 
BLOOMBERG (July 24, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-24/warren-wants-to-
stop-banks-from-dominating-trillions-in-payments [https://perma.cc/CCE7-FZGA] (quoting Senator 
Warren as saying, “People living paycheck-to-paycheck shouldn’t have to wait up to five days for a 
check to clear so that they can pay their rent, cover child care, or pick up groceries”). 
6. Throughout, this Article follows convention by using “Federal Reserve” or “the Fed” to 
refer to entities composing the Federal Reserve System. Of course, the Fed is “a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’” 
PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 13 (2016). Crucially 
for purposes of this Article, the Federal Reserve Banks constitute “corporate instrumentalities of the 
Federal Government created by Congress for the performance of governmental functions,” including, in 
particular, interventions in the payment system. Id. at 106 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, in addition to all else it does, promulgates regulations 
governing the Fed’s payment systems. See 12 U.S.C. § 248-1 (2018); 12 C.F.R. § 210 (2019). We 
provide more background on the Fed’s structure infra Section III.A. 
7. See Federal Reserve Actions to Support Interbank Settlement of Faster Payments, Notice 
and Request for Comment, 84 Fed. Reg. 39297, 39327 (Aug. 9, 2019); Governor Lael Brainard, Fed. 
Reserve Bd. of Governors, Digital Currencies, Stablecoins, and the Evolving Payments Landscape, 
Address at the Future of Money in the Digital Age Conference, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics (Oct. 16, 2019) (stating that FedNow would be the Fed’s “first new payment service in more 
than 40 years”). 
8. See infra Section II.C. “Good funds” is a colloquial term for withdrawable, spendable 
money. See Hal Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers and the Uniform New Payments Code, 83 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1664, 1670 (1983). 
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offering the same service”—offered to all financial institutions that participate 
in the U.S. banking system.9 The FedNow idea is still proceeding through the 
notice-and-comment rulemaking process, but the Fed seems intent on going 
forward with the project—to the point that Fed Chairman Jerome Powell has 
reported to Congress that the project is “ahead of schedule.”10 
Supporters and critics of FedNow largely agree on the goal of promoting 
the adoption of faster payments in the United States, which lags behind 
international standards for payment speed.11 But they disagree vehemently on 
the wisdom and legitimacy of a public option as a means toward that goal. Not 
only have FedNow’s critics taken issue with the project’s details; they have 
attacked it at a fundamental level, arguing that it represents an historically 
unprecedented—and possibly illegal—encroachment on financial turf that 
properly belongs to the private sector.12 Amid presidential efforts to undermine 
the Fed’s independence and political campaigns to “End the Fed,” these 
critiques raise the stakes for what has long been considered an entirely 
technocratic subject: the role of the Fed in the payment system.13 
This Article draws on law, history, and theory to show that the debate 
about whether or not the Fed should operate a new payment platform rests on 
false premises. The salient question is not whether the development of faster 
payments in the United States should be a private or public project. It is how 
the Fed should structure its multifaceted authorities as an operator, market 
participant, and regulator to accomplish the public policy goal of promoting 
faster payments. By weighing in on this question, our aim is to clarify and 
deepen the legal and administrative aspects of a debate that has already drawn 
in legislators,14 regulators,15 presidential candidates,16 and the key op-ed pages 
 
9. ANNE ALSTOTT & GANESH SITARAMAN, THE PUBLIC OPTION: HOW TO EXPAND FREEDOM, 
INCREASE OPPORTUNITY, AND PROMOTE EQUALITY 2 (2019). Most prominent public options involve 
public provision of important services directly to individuals; FedNow would exemplify a public option 
providing important services to other institutions. For discussion of proposed public options for banking 
services for individuals, see id. at 169-81; BARADARAN, supra note 2, at 183-226; Morgan Ricks, John 
Crawford & Lev Menand, Digital Dollars, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); K. Sabeel 
Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility 
Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1657-65 (2018). These banking proposals assume the existence of 
a payment platform to interconnect public-option accounts; the payment proposals we discuss below are 
therefore complementary to (or at least compatible with) the banking proposals. For an argument in 
favor of a public option in the credit-card clearing market, see Adam J. Levitin, Public-Private 
Competition in Payments: The Role of the Federal Reserve (Georgetown Law & Economics Research 
Papers, Paper No. 1420061, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1420061 [https://perma.cc/GE3L-YFZN]. 
10. John Heltman, Fed’s Faster Payments Network Likely Ahead of Schedule, AM. BANKER 
(Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/feds-faster-payments-network-likely-ahead-of-
schedule-powell [https://perma.cc/8MTZ-C56V]. 
11. See infra Section II.D. 
12. See id. 
13. For discussion of the “End the Fed” campaign and its political stakes, see Neil H. 
Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Don’t End or Audit the Fed: Central Bank Independence in an Age of 
Austerity, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2016). 
14. See, e.g., John Heltman, Democrats Try to Force Fed’s Hand on Faster Payments, AM. 
BANKER (July 24, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/elizabeth-warren-other-democrats-
look-to-force-feds-hand-on-faster-payments [https://perma.cc/3JUQ-S964] (quoting Senator Chris Van 
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of the financial press,17 but has fallen outside the purview of academic legal 
literature. 
Descriptively, this Article situates debates over faster payments in their 
statutory, regulatory, and historical context. Financial instruments and 
technologies that facilitate payment are fundamental to commerce,18 but the 
role of nation-state central banks in providing payment platforms is modern, 
uneven, and still controversial.19 Through an examination of its origins and 
evolution, we provide a detailed account of the Fed’s statutory and prudential 
role as a promoter and operator of payment platforms. This account reveals that 
the debate about faster payments is not only about frustratingly jargon-laden 
issues of payment technology and regulation, but also about statutory 
interpretation, administrative history, and even political theory about the proper 
functions of society’s basic financial infrastructure. Since its creation in 1913, 
the Fed has uneasily straddled the public-private divide. Its evolving role in the 
payment system provides a window onto the tensions inherent to the Fed’s 
hybridity. 
The Fed’s “essential hybridity” at the intersection of state and market can 
be seen across its functions, from its banking services to its control over the 
 
Hollen as saying, “I’ve pushed the Federal Reserve to develop a [new] system . . . , but progress has 
been too slow”). 
15. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITY: NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND INNOVATION 156 (July 2018), 
https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/A-Financial-System-that-Creates-Economic-
Opportunities---Nonbank-Financi....pdf [https://perma.cc/9SPK-Q9BB] (“Treasury encourages the 
Federal Reserve to move quickly in facilitating a faster retail payments system, such as through the 
development of a real-time settlement service that would allow for more efficient and widespread access 
to innovative payment capabilities.”). 
16. See Jesse Hamilton, Fed’s Real-Time Payments System to Compete with Wall Street, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-05/fed-plans-real-
time-payments-system-to-compete-with-wall-street [https://perma.cc/5UKZ-T8NF] (describing praise 
from Senator Elizabeth Warren); Ron Paul, Trump Is Right, the Fed Doesn’t Know What It’s Doing and 
It Could Get Worse, FOX BUS. (July 19, 2019) (criticizing the Fed’s plan). 
17. See Editorial Board, Jay Powell’s Public Option, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/jay-powells-public-option-11564786958 [https://perma.cc/2N4K-8L65] 
(criticizing the Fed’s plan); Editorial Board, The Very Political Fed, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-very-political-fed-11565047502 [https://perma.cc/M6HY-TW5A] 
(same); The Fed Says It Will Build a Real-Time Interbank Payments System, ECONOMIST (Aug. 10, 
2019), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2019/08/10/the-fed-says-it-will-build-a-real-
time-interbank-payments-system [https://perma.cc/5Z2T-CNJU] (same). 
18. See generally BENJAMIN GEVA, THE PAYMENT ORDER OF ANTIQUITY AND THE MIDDLE 
AGES: A LEGAL HISTORY (2011) (providing a history of payment methods over the longue durée). 
19. As Annelise Riles has written, “[w]hen central bankers assert that their work is 
technocratic and not political, they point to . . . mundane activities” such as “the work of designing and 
maintaining the payment system”—work that central bankers use “to confer legitimacy on central bank 
practices,” and which “turn[s] out to have important consequences” for the deep structure of markets. 
ANNELISE RILES, FINANCIAL CITIZENSHIP: EXPERTS, PUBLICS, AND THE POLITICS OF CENTRAL 
BANKING 32 (2018); see also LAWRENCE BROZ, THE INTERNATIONAL ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE SYSTEM 10 (1996) (highlighting the role of “pressure to remake the payments system” in the 
origins of the Fed). 
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money supply.20 Even so, its contingent participation in the payment system as 
a public-private entity demands additional policy justification. Normatively, the 
Article examines whether the Fed’s public-option approach holds the capacity 
to achieve three objectives at the heart of payment policy in the United States. 
Specifically, we ask whether it has the capacity to catalyze innovation, enhance 
access to faster payments, or shore up financial stability. Our assessment leads 
us to conclude that public options have delivered on these objectives in the 
past; there are theoretical reasons to believe that they are likely to do so in the 
future. Fed participation in the payment system and public-private competition 
are not troublesome bugs or unfortunate byproducts of political compromise. 
Rather, they represent valuable features of the Fed’s hybrid system. 
In making this argument, we draw out implications for the Fed’s new 
efforts to facilitate faster payments. In particular, we argue that far from 
representing an illegitimate departure from historical precedent and statutory 
authority, FedNow would fit squarely within the Fed’s longstanding role in the 
financial-system structure entrenched by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. 
While the Fed’s status as participant in and supervisor of the payment system 
produces tensions, they are the defining tensions of public central banking—
and have been for centuries. 
Beyond engaging with the role of the Fed as purveyor of public options, 
we build on the idea of public-private hybridity to identify a range of other 
tools that the Fed may use to foment faster payment development. In particular, 
we show that the Fed holds a range of policy levers, which we place on a 
continuum from market-participation to straightforward coercion. To hasten the 
development of faster payments in the United States, the Fed has the ability to 
leverage its powers not only as a payment system operator, but also as a user of 
payment systems, and the principal regulator and supervisor of those systems. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on the 
payment system—an ever-evolving collection of public, private, and hybrid 
institutions that facilitate different kinds of monetary transactions for different 
kinds of parties. Part II introduces the debate over faster payments and 
FedNow. By presenting the legal literature’s first account of its policy 
rationale, administrative underpinnings, and prominent critiques, we situate the 
rest of the Article’s analysis of the Fed’s hybrid role in the payment system. In 
Part III, we examine legal and prudential justifications for the Fed’s role as 
provider of interbank, public-option payment platforms. This account 
intertwines the history of the U.S. payments system—including Congress’s 
establishment of the Fed as both supervisor of that system and participant 
within it—with contemporary policy justifications. In particular, we argue that 
the Fed has beneficial roles to play as a promoter of interbank competition, as a 
 
20. See Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 314 (2013) 
(describing finance as “occupy[ing] an essentially hybrid place between state and market”); Perry 
Mehrling, Essential Hybridity: A Money View of FX, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 355 (2013). 
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funder of payment innovation spillovers, and as a guarantor of payment-system 
stability. In Part IV, we elaborate on the hybrid view of the Fed’s role in the 
payment system by looking beyond provision of interbank platforms. In 
particular, we evaluate a suite of Fed tools to promote the private development 
of faster payments in the United States, whatever comes of FedNow in the 
medium- or long-term. We present this menu along a spectrum ranging from 
noncoercive market activity to coercive regulatory authority, revealing how the 
Fed’s hybrid role affords it a plethora of levers to promote payment innovation 
and competition. 
I. Background: A Simple Taxonomy of Payment Platforms 
To situate our account of the Fed’s hybrid role and its implications for 
faster payments, this Part provides background on the institutions that facilitate 
payment in the United States. While scholars have offered other broad 
overviews of payment platforms in the United States,21 our description of these 
institutions emphasizes the importance of public-private interaction in the 
construction of the payment system as a whole. 
Payments are legal acts that put “money in motion.”22 In a world where 
most money is held on the books of financial institutions—think account 
balances at your preferred bank or brokerage—the most important methods of 
putting money in motion involve transfers between accounts.23 Simplifying a 
bit, these transfers take place in two basic steps. First, payment is initiated 
between two “end users” of the financial system—say, two businesses in a 
supply chain, or a tenant and a landlord. The platforms that facilitate this step 
 
21. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON, & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 751-76 (2016); LYNN M. LOPUCKI, ELIZABETH WARREN, DANIEL 
KEATING, RONALD J. MANN, & ROBERT M. LAWLESS, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMS 
APPROACH 359-65 (6th ed. 2016). 
22. Joseph Sommer, Where Is the Economic Analysis of Payment Law, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
751, 753 (2008); see also EDWARD L. RUBIN & ROBERT COOTER, THE PAYMENT SYSTEM: CASES, 
MATERIALS AND ISSUES 1 (2d ed. 1994) (“Payment instruments are devices for transferring value from 
one person to another, with value being defined as the power to purchase goods and services in the 
market.”). 
23. Cf. Fairfax Leary, Jr., & Patricia B. Fry, A “Systems” Approach to Payment Modes: 
Moving Toward a New Payment Code, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 283, 287 (1984) (“Conceptually, all [noncash] 
payment modes are alike in that the ultimate object is the safe transfer of deposit institution credit from 
the institution used by a debtor or donor to deposit institution credit in the creditor-donee’s selected 
institution.”). As Morgan Ricks puts it, account money can be thought of as “uncertificated” money, 
while coins and bills can be thought of as “certificated” money. Money as Infrastructure, 2018 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 757, 760-61. Despite reports of its desuetude, cash is still in heavy use. A representative 
sample from 2017 used cash in thirty percent of reported consumer transactions. See Claire Green & 
Joanna Stavins, The 2017 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice, FED. RES. BK. OF ATLANTA RESEARCH 
DATA REPORTS, 18-05, at 14 (2018). But the other seventy percent of their transactions involved 
account money. Id. Nonconsumer transactions are likely to lean even more heavily toward account 
money. See KENNETH ROGOFF, THE CURSE OF CASH: HOW LARGE-DENOMINATION BILLS AID CRIME 
AND TAX EVASION 48-49 (2016). 
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of the payment process are called retail payment systems.24 Second, the two 
banks that provide accounts for those end users must settle up between 
themselves. The payment platforms that operate between and among banks are 
called interbank—or wholesale—payment systems.25 
When individuals and small firms pay each other, they usually use a retail 
method—paper cash, a handwritten check, a credit card, Venmo.26 With the 
exception of cash, each of these retail methods enables its users to transfer 
money between accounts at financial institutions—usually banks, but 
sometimes nonbank payment-service providers.27 Users see money come and 
go from these accounts every time they make or receive retail payments. 
This ground-level view raises a fundamental question: How does money 
sitting in the bank of, say, a tenant, make its way to the account of her 
landlord? 
The answer to this question points to the second, wholesale step of the 
payment process, and it sheds light on where FedNow aims to enter the scene. 
Throughout the day, the customers of Banks A, B, and C make many payments 
between each other. How do Banks A, B, and C figure out how to adjust their 
accounts to settle up all the activity? In the earliest days of capitalism, banks 
would have “walk clerks” literally carry paper payment instruments back and 
forth and hand them to each other in exchange for cash.28 Today, they use 
specialized electronic platforms for transfers of money held on the books of a 
 
24. See FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION EXAMINATION COUNCIL, RETAIL PAYMENT 
SYSTEMS BOOKLET 2 (2016). 
25. There is no “definitive division between retail and wholesale payments.” Id. at 3. The 
division instead is an attempt to locate platforms at the edge or the core of the broader system. Cf. Perry 
Mehrling, The State as Financial Intermediary, 34 J. ECON. ISSUES 365, 365-66 (2000); Pistor, supra 
note 20, at 316 (distinguishing between a systemic “apex” and its periphery). For more discussion of 
these divisions, see Dan Awrey & Kristin van Zwieten, The Shadow Payment System, 43 J. CORP. L. 
775, 781-82 (2018). 
26. While paper methods like the check used to dominate, most retail payments today are 
electronic. See Clare Greene & Joanna Stavins, The 2017 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice, FED. 
RES. BANK ATLANTA 6-7 (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.frbatlanta.org/-
/media/documents/banking/consumer-payments/research-data-reports/2018/the-2017-diary-of-
consumer-payment-choice/rdr1805.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7VL-U2TH]; David B. Humphrey, Moshe 
Kim, & Bent Vale, Realizing the Gains from Electronic Payments: Costs, Pricing, and Payment Choice, 
33 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 216, 217 (2001) (noting that only twenty-three percent of noncash 
payments in the United States were electronic in 1996). Note that while Greene and Stavins distinguish 
between ACH-intermediated electronic funds transfers and payments intermediated by the card 
networks, we treat them both as constituents of the broader “electronic” category. 
27. See Awrey & Van Zweiten, supra note 25, at 800. 
28. As Gary Gorton and Ellis Tallman describe the “walk clerk” process, 
On any day, the Corn Exchange Bank will hold many checks drawn on Butcher’s and 
Drover’s Bank and vice versa. One way to clear these checks held by Corn Exchange Bank 
and drawn on Butcher’s and Drover’s Bank is for Corn Exchange Bank to send a clerk, called 
a “walk clerk,” to take the checks to Butcher’s and Drover’s Bank and receive or pay cash. 
The walk clerk has to carry money in case he needs to pay. And if he receives cash, then he 
returns to Corn Exchange Bank with the cash. Meanwhile, Butcher’s and Drover’s Bank sends 
its own walk clerk to do the same thing. 
GARY B. GORTON & ELLIS W. TALLMAN, FIGHTING FINANCIAL CRISES: LEARNING FROM THE PAST 13 
(2018). 
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third party. Some of the platforms that facilitate these transfers are offered by 
private operators, but the most important of these enable transfers between 
balances held by financial institutions on the books of the Federal Reserve.29 
The Fed operates multiple payment platforms that its thousands of 
accountholders—mainly banks, government entities, and private financial 
utilities—use to transmit over three trillion dollars between their Federal 
Reserve bank accounts on a daily basis.30 These include a check-clearing 
system; a system for “automated clearing house” (ACH) transfers called 
FedACH; and the behemoth of them all, an instantaneous wire-transfer system 
called Fedwire.31 If it is built, FedNow will join these ranks. 
The Fed, however, is not the only provider of interbank payment systems 
in the United States. It directly competes with private operators. For instance, 
FedACH competes with a private platform called the Electronic Payments 
Network (EPN), which is operated by a cooperative of banks called The 
Clearing House.32 In 2018, FedACH cleared almost 15 billion transactions and 
$25 trillion per year,33 compared to 8 billion transactions and $26 trillion 
cleared on the private EPN.34 Though The Clearing House’s private ACH 
platform has different membership and different pricing, it uses substantially 
the same rules and procedures as the Fed.35 Similar competition exists between 
public Fedwire and the private Clearing House Interbank Payment System 
(CHIPS).36 And similar competition will exist between public FedNow and a 
 
29. See PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED BECAME THE DEALER 
OF LAST RESORT 13 (2010) (“When one bank makes a payment to another, the mechanism involves 
changing entries on the balance sheet of the central bank; there is a debit to the account of the bank 
paying and a credit to the account of the bank being paid.”). 
30. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 104TH ANNUAL REPORT: 2017, at 92-
93 (2018) (noting that “[w]hen one bank makes a payment to another, the mechanism involves changing 
entries on the balance sheet of the central bank”). This figure underestimates the Fed’s daily volumes 
because it does not include the Fed’s settlement service for private clearinghouses, the National 
Settlement Service. See id. 
31. See id. 
32. See ACH, THE CLEARING HOUSE, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/payment-systems/ach 
[https://perma.cc/X83C-HLF3]. 
33. See Automated Clearinghouse Services, Commercial Automated Clearinghouse 
Transactions Processed by the Federal Reserve, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedach_yearlycomm.htm [https://perma.cc/M2GM-
3BHA]. 
34. Statistics on EPN are not available directly, but the combined ACH statistics (from which 
the Fed numbers, id., were subtracted) are available from the National Automated Clearing House 
Association. See ACH Network Moves 23 Billion Payments and $51 Trillion in 2018, NAT’L 
AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS’N (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nacha.org/news/ach-network-
moves-23-billion-payments-and-51-trillion-2018 [https://perma.cc/3XG7-UQPL]. 
35. See Steven L. Harris, Introduction to Rethinking Payments Law, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
477, 487 (2008). To effectuate final transfers between the banks that use it, the Clearing House’s EPN 
sends a simple file to the Federal Reserve on a daily basis explaining to the Fed which accounts to adjust 
and by how much. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 442 
(2003) (stating that EPN settles through the National Settlement Service). 
36. See Awrey & Van Zweiten, supra note 25, at 792. 
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private system called RTP.37 It is this last zone of competition that is stirring 
significant controversy. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the relative size of these different payment 
platforms in the United States by charting each according to the volume of 
transactions they carry annually, and the total value of those transactions in 
dollars, respectively.38 Ownership by private entities is denoted by an open 
bubble; public by a closed one. 
 
37. See infra Section II.C. 
38. As noted above, the “wholesale” terminology is clumsy and does not cleanly delineate 
different kinds of payment systems. See discussion supra note 25. Suggesting, for example, that “retail” 
systems—those on the left in our figures—are solely consumer-oriented and that “wholesale” systems—
those on the right in our figures—are solely for banks is a simplification. For instance, when a real estate 
buyer wires money to close a purchase, the payment is likely intermediated over Fedwire. See, e.g., Brad 
Dashoff & John Antonacci, Organizing Transaction Closings, in THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 
LAWYER’S JOB: A SURVIVAL GUIDE ch. 19 (2009). We nevertheless adopt that terminology because of 
its ubiquity in the payments literature and because it speaks to important patterns of use. 
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39. All data are for 2015, the last year for which all data were available. For the sources of 
Figures 1 and 2, see CHIPS Annual Statistics from 1970 to 2019, CLEARING HOUSE, 
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/new/tch/documents/payment-systems/chips-volume_v2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3V3N-92E4] (for data on values and volume for CHIPS); Currency and Coin 
Services, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE 
SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/coin_data.htm [https://perma.cc/7SX9-VAY5] 
(for data on values and volume of currency and coin); Fedwire Funds Service, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. 
RESERVE 
SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedfunds_ann.htm [https://perma.cc/2TYU-
MVXF] (for data on values and volume of Fedwire); Introduction to CLS, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y., 
(May 2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/banking/international/14-CLS-2015-Kos-
Puth.pdf [https://perma.cc/CNX6-RXRD] (for data on average daily values and volume for CLS); 
National Settlement Service, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/natl_ann.htm [https://perma.cc/JQB3-PJCU] (for data 
on values and volume of the National Settlement Service); The Federal Reserve Payments Study 2016, 
BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/2016-
payment-study-accessible.htm#figure2 [ https://perma.cc/PSR9-3T9W] (for figures on 2015 volume and 
value for checks, debit cards, credit cards, and ACH).    
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These figures illustrate the two central divides in the payment system—
retail versus wholesale, and public versus private. It also illustrates two 
important phenomena. First, the number of transactions cleared and settled 
through wholesale platforms is substantially fewer than the number of 
transactions cleared through retail platforms; the opposite is true when we look 
at the dollar value of these transactions.41 Second, it illustrates the significance 
in the wholesale market of public-sector provision. 
With this background in place, we are now ready to engage with the 
debate over FedNow and place it in the broader context of the Fed’s role in the 
payment system. 
II. The Fed’s Proposed Public Option: Context and Critiques 
To ground the Article’s engagement with deeper questions of law and 
theory regarding the Fed’s role in the payment system, this Part describes the 
rationale for, and the administrative process undergirding, the proposed 
 
40. See supra note 39. 
41. We discuss one reason for this dynamic infra text accompanying notes 45-46 (describing 
deferred net settlement). 
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FedNow platform. It then describes the range of public opinion regarding 
FedNow, with particular emphasis on commentators whose criticisms sound in 
a legal register. 
A. The Question of Settlement Speed 
Payment with cash is simple and speedy. A book-buyer hands a twenty-
dollar bill to a bookseller, and legal title to the twenty dollars transfers in an 
instant.42 Not so with money our book-buyer holds in account with her 
financial institution. When she goes to pay with a credit card, Venmo, or 
another retail payment method, the bookseller will only receive good funds 
after the successful completion of a process through which multiple financial 
institutions ensure the payment is authorized, identify whose accounts should 
be adjusted, and coordinate those changes in account balances. This process 
requires an extraordinary amount of coordination, technology, and law.43 As a 
result, even with advanced computing and telecommunications technology, 
leading retail systems in the United States typically take between a day or two 
to settle—and sometimes much longer.44 
One aspect of the complete process—and one determinant of payment 
speed from the perspective of the book-buyer and bookseller—involves 
interbank settlement. As we mentioned in Part I, the platforms that facilitate 
interbank settlement are designed to carry a lower volume of transactions than 
retail systems, but with much higher per-payment value. The predominant 
mode of settlement on these systems (with the exception of Fedwire) is known 
 
42. See, e.g., Chapman v. Cole, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 141, 143 (1858) (“Even when money is 
stolen, and it is passed by a thief, it becomes property of him to whom it is passed for a valuable 
consideration, and without knowledge that it was stolen.”). Jeanne Schroeder refers to this as money’s 
“super-negotiability.” Jeanne L. Schroeder, Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 U. MIAMI 
BUS. L.J. 1, 15-16 (2015). 
43. Fairfax Leary and Patricia Fry, for instance, enumerate eight “essential stages common to 
all payment modes,” including “authorization from the debtor” to initiate the payment, transmittal of a 
message from the debtor to the debtor’s bank, processing by the debtor’s bank, transfer of credit 
between deposit institutions, and the sending of a “completion signal.” Leary, Jr. & Fry, supra note 23, 
at 288-89. 
44. For instance, under the Expedited Funds Availability Act, banks must provide 
withdrawable funds within two days for checks of “local” origin, and within five for “out-of-town” 
checks. See David Gray Carlson, Check Clearing and Voidable Preference Under the Bankruptcy Code, 
73 BUS. LAW. 627, 698 (2018). But due to Federal Reserve regulation, “almost all checks are considered 
local these days.” Id. Credit- and debit-card transactions usually settle within two days, via a deferred 
net settlement over Fedwire or ACH. See Susan Herbst-Murphy, Clearing and Settlement of Interbank 
Card Transactions: A MasterCard Tutorial for Federal Reserve Payment Analysts, FED. RESERVE 
BANK OF PHILA. 12 n.25, 18, fig.1 (Oct. 2013), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/consumer-
finance-institute/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-papers/2013/D-2013-October-Clearing-
Settlement.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7XG-RTBY]. In 2018, a new service called “Same-Day ACH” 
accounted for less than one percent of transactional volume. See 2018 ACH Network Volume and Value, 
NAT’L AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS’N (2019), https://www.nacha.org/sites/default/files/2019-
04/2018%20ACH%20Network%20Volume%20and%20Value.pdf [https://perma.cc/YK7T-3R9F]. This 
indicates that nearly all ACH-intermediated payments settle, at the earliest, on a next-day basis. 
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as “deferred net settlement.”45 Imagine three banks, A, B, and C, each of which 
holds an account of its own at the Federal Reserve. Imagine further that the 
customers of banks A, B, and C make payments to each other throughout the 
business day via a retail platform. At the end of each daily cycle, the three 
banks “net out” the total dollar amounts flowing to and from their respective 
accountholders on that retail platform, and then each make or receive a single 
payment on the books of the Federal Reserve to cover the day’s transactions. 
Through the act of netting, which offsets outgoing payments with incoming 
payments occurring during the same settlement cycle, banks greatly reduce the 
reserves necessary to support a given level of end-user payment activity.46  
While deferred net settlement is an elegant model, it creates problems for 
the speed of payment. To see this, let us consider its role in holding back the 
advance of faster payments in the United States. 
In the financial industry, “faster payment” refers to any payment method 
that enables the end users of the financial system—households, businesses, 
universities, municipalities, and the like—to send and receive account money 
in or close to real time.47 The United States is a laggard when it comes to faster 
payments. In contrast to nearly a dozen other countries, where a major portion 
of retail payment activity transpires over faster payment systems, the United 
States lacks serious volume on its faster payment platforms.48 Instead, retail 
activity remains mainly focused on cash, card, check, and ACH.49 This is 
because in the United States today, the leading faster payment platforms either 
operate outside the traditional banking network, and thus are not viable large-
scale options at present, or they are in their incipiency. 
The present limitations on faster payment systems that operate outside the 
traditional banking system can be seen through the cases of the two most 
prominent: Venmo and Square Cash. Venmo—a mobile phone-based payment 
system operated by PayPal Holdings—enables anyone who has downloaded 
 
45. See David Humphrey, Payments and Payment Systems, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
BANKING 418 (Allen N. Berger et al. eds., 2015). 
46. See, e.g., Morten Bech & Bart Hobjin, Technology Diffusion Within Central Banking: The 
Case of Real-Time Gross Settlement, 3 INT’L J. CENT. BANKING 147, 154 (2007) (explaining that 
deferred net settlement systems require less intraday liquidity than real-time gross settlement systems). 
47. Potential Federal Reserve Actions to Support Interbank Settlement of Faster Payments, 
Request for Comments, 83 Fed. Reg. 57351, 57352 (Nov. 15, 2018) (noting that “[t]he term ‘faster 
payments’ is broadly used in the payment industry to indicate simply that increased speed, convenience, 
and accessibility are essential features for the future of the payment and settlement system,” and 
emphasizing that “[f]aster payments allow end users to initiate and receive payments at any time of the 
day, any day of the year, and to complete those payments in near-real time (from the end users’ 
perspective), such that, within seconds, the recipient has access to final funds that can be used to make 
other payments”). 
48. See FIS, FLAVORS OF FAST REPORT 2018, http://empower1.fisglobal.com/rs/650-KGE-
239/images/FLAVOR-OF-FAST-Report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/BH6V-RF5T] (presenting a survey 
of faster payment systems around the world, and indicating that U.S. lacks volume on its systems, 
whereas other countries see significant volume on theirs). 
49. See discussion supra note 23. 
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the Venmo app to pay other members of the Venmo network.50 But these 
payments do not move between users’ bank accounts. Rather, they move 
between users’ Venmo accounts. Users who hold funds in their Venmo 
accounts in reality hold a claim against the assets of PayPal Holdings.51 The 
Square Cash mobile system functions similarly.52 These systems operate with 
efficiency because they hold the accounts of all users on a single set of books. 
This has helped them garner popularity, especially for peer-to-peer payments 
between friends and family. But despite their specialized utility, Venmo, 
Square Cash, and similar “on-us” payment systems are deficient in two ways 
when compared to systems that intermediate between the books of multiple 
financial institutions. 
First, Venmo and Square Cash raise serious customer-protection problems 
because they operate at the perimeter of the federal apparatus for bank 
regulation.53 While funds held for network members on the books of Venmo 
and Square Cash are segregated from corporate funds,54 they are not nearly as 
safe as assets deposited in traditional bank accounts. That is because they lack 
the federal deposit insurance protections accorded to bank depositors in the 
wake of the Great Depression. In the event of the insolvency of PayPal or 
Square, accountholders would not have access to the usual $250,000 in Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation coverage available to customers of insolvent 
banks.55 Instead, accountholders would have unsecured claims against the 
bankrupt estate—possibly leading to long waiting periods for access to pennies 
on the dollar.56 
 
50. See I Paid a New User!, VENMO, https://www.help.venmo.com/hc/en-
us/articles/217532047-I-paid-a-New-User- [https://perma.cc/S62P-4SDV] (“Any time you pay an email 
address or phone number that isn’t associated with an active Venmo account, we consider it a payment 
to a New User. This is usually because your friend hasn’t added that email address or phone number to 
their Venmo account, or they haven’t created a Venmo account yet. If your friend wants to accept the 
money, please have them follow the instructions to sign up or add the additional email address to their 
Venmo account.”) The same is true with payments on PayPal itself between users, but the PayPal UX 
intentionally blurs the distinction between a user’s PayPal balance and traditional bank-based checking, 
debit, and credit card accounts. 
51. See Awrey & Van Zweiten, supra note 25; User Agreement, VENMO, 
https://www.venmo.com/legal/us-user-agreement [https://perma.cc/FX2S-YWZ7] [hereinafter Venmo 
User Agreement]. 
52. See Fitz Tepper, Square’s Cash App Now Supports Direct Deposits for Your Paycheck, 
TECHCRUNCH, (Mar. 3, 2018), https://www.techcrunch.com/2018/03/07/square-cash-now-supports-
direct-deposits-for-your-paycheck [https://perma.cc/6W9U-A2GT]. 
53. On this, see Awrey & Van Zweiten, supra note 25. For general accounts of the regulatory 
perimeter, see Eric Biber, Sarah E. Light, J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulating Business Innovation 
as Policy Disruption: From the Model T to Airbnb, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1561 (2018). 
54. See Venmo User Agreement, supra note 51; Additional Cash Terms of Service, SQUARE, 
https://cash.app/legal/us/en-us/tos [https://perma.cc/LS75-E9YK] [together hereinafter User 
Agreements]. 
55. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (2018). 
56. See User Agreements, supra note 54; Awrey & Van Zweiten, supra note 25. Defenders 
might retort that PayPal and Square do not engage in risky practices and thus are much less susceptible 
as a practical matter to runs. But this argument is the refuge of all financial institutions—until they turn 
out to have been risky after all. 
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Second, these systems also operate on the economic perimeter of the 
financial system. To transfer money from a Venmo or Square Cash account to a 
traditional bank account—in order to pay one’s utility bills, rent, or credit card 
bills—one must wait between one and three days for Venmo or Square to make 
the transfer using the traditional electronic payment system, ACH.57 This cost 
of transfer effectively places accountholder funds in a walled garden. The funds 
are easily spendable in transactions with payees who are willing to receive 
Venmo-account money, but not those who wish to receive traditional, flexible 
bank-account money. In a world where households and businesses naturally 
want to engage in diverse transactions—necessitating access to diverse 
payment systems—it is extremely valuable to hold one’s assets in a single 
location that interconnects with each of those systems.58 This is the banking 
system—the old standby with the Fed’s interbank settlement systems at its 
core. 
While Venmo and Square Cash are presently deficient because they 
operate outside the traditional banking network, the leading in-network faster 
payment platform—called Zelle—is in its incipiency.59 The Zelle network was 
developed initially by a joint venture of three of the most prominent retail 
banks in the country—Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and JPMorgan Chase—
and began operating in 2016.60 It now serves over 750 financial institutions,61 
and its network can reach the bank accounts of over 95 million consumers in 
 
57. See User Agreements, supra note 54. One may also transfer a Venmo balance to a debit 
card in thirty minutes, albeit for a one-percent transfer fee. Venmo User Agreement, supra note 51. 
58. See Clayton P. Gillette & Steven D. Walt, Uniformity and Diversity in Payment Systems, 
83 CHI.-KENT L. REV 499 (2008) (analyzing the value of diversity among payment systems). It bears 
noting that cryptocurrency-based payment systems suffer from the same deficiency as Venmo and 
Square on this front. In a dollar-denominated economy, if someone possesses Bitcoin or another 
cryptocurrency, they must convert their asset to dollars in order to spend their wealth. This requires a 
costly bridge between the cryptocurrency system and the common payment rails that people who accept 
dollars use to receive them. 
59. While other faster payment systems are in the early phases of development and 
deployment, they do not currently compare to Zelle in terms of market penetration or ability to push 
money directly to bank accounts, as opposed to debit card accounts. See, e.g., Mastercard Send, 
MASTERCARD, https://www.mastercard.us/en-us/issuers/products-and-solutions/customer-
needs/consumer-solutions/mastercardsend.html [https://perma.cc/FCE7-AN4R]; Shazam Bolt$, 
SHAZAM, https://bolts.shazam.net/ShazamWebPortal/index.php [https://perma.cc/HZ2S-FHJS]; Visa 
Direct Enables Fast Payments to Over a Billion Cards Worldwide, VISA, https://usa.visa.com/run-your-
business/visa-direct.html [https://perma.cc/U893-YA2D]. Other prominent, technologically advanced 
systems like Apple Pay and Amazon Pay do not compete on underlying settlement speed. Instead, they 
employ novel end-user technologies like QR Codes, Near-Field Communications, and sleek web 
interfaces to alter the user experience associated with existing payment methods. In the words of Howell 
Jackson, Michael Barr, and Margaret Tahyar, such services are “new technologies running on old rails.” 
BARR, JACKSON, & TAHYAR, supra note 21, at 796. 
60. See Sarah Perez, Zelle, the Real-Time Venmo Competitor Backed by Over 30 U.S. Banks, 
Arrives this Month, TECHCRUNCH (June 12, 2016), https://www.techcrunch.com/2017/06/12/zelle-the-
real-time-venmo-competitor-backed-by-over-30-u-s-banks-arrives-this-month [https://perma.cc/8SSR-
CFQR]. 
61. See Innovation. Powered by Partnerships., ZELLE, https://www.zellepay.com/partners 
[https://perma.cc/9ZLH-5PLQ]. 
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the United States.62 Because of this reach, and the prominence of its backers, 
Zelle is likely to gain significant traction in the banking system. 
Yet despite its promise, Zelle’s growth is presently limited by its own 
policies. Most banks that participate in Zelle impose periodic limits on gross 
inflows to and outflows from each account. For instance, PNC Bank imposes 
$1,000 daily and $5,000 monthly limits on its accountholders.63 These limits 
reflect the variable costs incurred by banks to post Zelle transactions—
currently much higher than variable costs for comparable payments like 
checking or e-bill pay. They also reflect business decisions about whether and 
how to prioritize different payment services. Finally, they reflect the fact that 
the banks that intermediate Zelle payments bear more risk to ensure that end 
users receive funds in near-real-time. 
Some of this risk arises due to the role of deferred net settlement to 
Zelle’s operations. Zelle is the appearance of real-time settlement without its 
reality.64 The banks themselves are not transmitting funds between each other 
in real time. In other words, while users of Zelle get to feel like they are 
sending money as it were an email, “the funds are actually settled behind the 
scenes afterwards.”65 During the interim, the banks bear the risk of loss if they 
advance funds before receiving final settlement.66 Because of this risk, they 
impose their periodic limits on the use of the platform. 
Due to these limits, and many other factors as well, Zelle presently 
facilitates only a small portion of retail payments made in the United States. 
While Zelle intermediated payments of almost $200 billion in 2019, this 
represents less than ten percent of the value intermediated by credit cards—
despite a much lower per-payment value for card transactions—and less than 
one percent of the value intermediated by the supposedly dead checking 
system.67 These figures indicate the low levels of adoption of even the leading 
 
62. See id. 
63. PNC Together with Zelle, PNC BANK, https://www.pnc.com/en/personal-
banking/banking/online-and-mobile-banking/zelle.html [https://perma.cc/7JL9-8654]. 
64. Cf. Tom C.W. Lin, Infinite Financial Intermediation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 645, 656 
(2015) (describing the “mirage of disintermediation” involved with many financial technology 
ventures). 
65. Understanding Zelle, AM. BANKERS ASS’N 5, 
https://www.aba.com/Tools/Function/Technology/Documents/UnderstandingZelle.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NWK5-MM9A]. 
66. See Potential Federal Reserve Actions to Support Interbank Settlement of Faster 
Payments, Request for Comments, 83 Fed. Reg. 57351, 57358 (Nov. 15, 2018) (“Because the recipient’s 
bank makes final funds available to the recipient before interbank settlement occurs, DNS arrangements 
for faster payments inherently generate interbank credit risk for the recipient’s bank. If a sending bank 
in the arrangement fails to pay a net obligation, receiving banks are at risk of losing the full value of 
funds that they have already made available to recipients. In addition, this scenario could generate 
liquidity risks for receiving banks if, subsequent to a sending bank’s failure to pay, settlement amounts 
are recalculated and banks may receive less or have to pay more than expected.” (footnote omitted)). 
67. See Press Release, Zelle, Gift Giving Helps Zelle Wrap Up 2019 with Double Digit 
Growth (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.zellepay.com/press-releases/gift-giving-helps-zelle-wrap-2019-
double-digit-growth [https://perma.cc/F8ZX-A3DM]. 
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faster payment system by payors and payees to date. Given how central 
network effects are in payment systems,68 this failure must be reversed if faster 
payments are to succeed. 
B. The High Cost of Slow Settlement 
Why do policymakers care about faster payments? For some—particularly 
those with a financial cushion—slow settlement is an inconvenience. It adds an 
element of complexity to the management of cash inflow and outflow, but it 
seems perhaps not worth much public policy attention.69 This view is incorrect 
for many reasons. To foreground just one, it reflects the luxurious budgeting of 
those far from a financial emergency. In fact, slow settlement contributes to 
demand for multiple consumer financial products that raise serious policy 
concerns. These financial products—check-cashing services, overdraft 
protection, and payday loans—offer “just-in-time” money, but they come at a 
high cost.70 Their high effective interest rates regularly push poor households 
into financial distress. 
To understand the basic fact pattern through which slow settlement 
contributes to the demand for risky short-term consumer credit products, take a 
stylized scenario. Imagine a person named Simon, who, like a large percentage 
of Americans, has fewer than $400 in liquid assets.71 Imagine also that he owes 
$600 in rent, due next Friday, and expects to receive $300 in wages the same 
day. If Simon’s payment comes in cash, and his landlord accepts cash for rent, 
then settlement will be immediate. But if he is paid via check or ACH, or must 
pay rent via check or ACH, it is unlikely he will be able to pay his rent on time. 
When payday is on the last day of the month ahead of a weekend, or during a 
three-day holiday weekend, the delays are only worse.72 
 
68. See, e.g., OZ SHY, THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 201-10 (2001). 
69. Even on its own, the extra administrative burden would have important distributive 
consequences worthy of policy attention. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103 GEO. L.J. 1409 (2015) 
(analyzing the equity and efficiency stakes of the managerial and secretarial work it takes to run a 
household). 
70. Some of the foundational literature on short-term credit includes Oren Bar-Gill & 
Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. 
McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 
(2002); and Ronald Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855 (2006). Recent 
valuable contributions include Natasha Sarin, Making Consumer Finance Work, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 
1519 (2019). 
71. See Jeanna Smialek, Many Adults Would Struggle to Find $400, the Fed Finds, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/23/business/economy/fed-400-dollar-
survey.html [https://perma.cc/4N9B-HKQQ] (“Four in 10 American adults wouldn’t be able to cover an 
unexpected $400 expense with cash, savings or a credit-card charge that could be quickly paid off . . . 
.”). 
72. See Aaron Klein, Fellow in Economic Studies, Comment Letter on Potential Federal 
Reserve Actions to Support Interbank Settlement of Faster Payments, BROOKINGS INST. 5 (Dec. 14, 
2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2019/March/20190315/OP-1625/OP-
1625_121418_133277_428769914666_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/KHW6-8QDA]. 
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The options, during these delays, are simple: either default or find money 
elsewhere.73 That “elsewhere” very often includes expensive alternatives such 
as payday lending and check-cashing services. The speed of the payment 
system in delivering Simon’s $300 payday directly determines whether Simon 
must access expensive short-term credit. 
Available evidence suggests that the slowness of major retail payment 
platforms does contribute to demand for expensive short-term credit. This can 
be seen in markets for two types of such credit services: check-cashing and 
overdraft protection. Check-cashing refers to the service, offered by many 
banks and nonbank lenders, of providing immediate good funds to a check’s 
payee in exchange for a fee.74 Check-cashing enables payees to access 
spendable money in advance of when their checks would otherwise settle; 
payees pay the fee to compensate check-cashing providers for the risk they bear 
that a check will not be honored by the bank upon which it is drawn. The fees 
paid for this service can be quite steep;75 they are often the target of consumer-
protection criticisms76 and calls for greater financial literacy so that consumers 
will know to avoid them.77 
One recent study presents striking evidence of the role of payment speed 
in driving demand for check-cashing. Economists Ryan McDevitt and Aaron 
Sojourner examined five and a half years of check-cashing transactions 
conducted by customers of Spring Bank, located in The Bronx, New York.78 
Over this period, Spring Bank’s accountholders brought 46,669 checks to 
Spring Bank.79 Remarkably, though these customers could deposit their checks 
for free into their accounts, over twenty percent of these checks were not 
deposited; they were cashed, and cashed at great expense.80 
 
73. Some critics of payday lending urge those who are drawn to it to “save up . . . or borrow 
from friends and family.” LISA SERVON, THE UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE MIDDLE CLASS 
SURVIVES 82 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
74. See RACHEL SCHNEIDER & BALAFAMA LONGJOHN, CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, 
BEYOND CHECK-CASHING: AN EXAMINATION OF CONSUMER DEMAND AND BUSINESS INNOVATION FOR 
IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO CHECK FUNDS 5 (2014). 
75. See Jane Cover, Amy Fuhrman Spring & Rachel Garshick Kleit, Minorities on the 
Margins? The Spatial Organization of Fringe Banking Services, 33 J. URBAN AFF. 317, 319 (2011) 
(reporting fees that claim between one and fifteen percent of check values). 
76. See, e.g., JEAN ANN FOX & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, 
CASHED OUT: CONSUMERS PAY STEEP PREMIUM TO “BANK” AT CHECK CASHING OUTLETS (2006), 
https://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFA_2006_Check_Cashing_Study111506.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5HZR-M73G]. 
77. See Lisa J. Servon & Robert Kaestner, Consumer Financial Literacy and the Impact of 
Online Banking on the Financial Behavior of Lower-Income Bank Customers, 42 J. CONSUMER AFF. 
271, 274 (2008) (discussing calls for financial literacy motivated by check-cashing usage). 
78. See Ryan C. McDevitt & Aaron Sojourner, Demand, Regulation, and Welfare on the 
Margin of Alternative Financial Services (July 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~rcm26/mcdevitt_sojourner_july2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DAS-
LEKW]. 
79. Id. at 20. 
80. Id. at 21. 
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It is worth emphasizing that the subjects of the McDevitt and Sojourner 
study were part of the mainstream financial system, but they still chose to pay 
dearly to cash their checks. Why would this be? The answer is to avoid the 
delay of the check-clearing system. Exploiting data on expected check-clearing 
times, McDevitt and Sojourner estimate that every day of wait time drove an 
approximately sixty-five percent increase in demand for check-cashing 
services.81 Given that the average Spring Bank check-cashing customer was 
willing to pay a 274% effective annual percentage rate, the costs imposed on 
Spring Bank customers by the slowness of the check-clearing system are quite 
significant.82 But, of course, the costs of missed bills or of fees charged by 
banks for account overdrafts are worse still and thus rationally avoided.83 
And though the consumers cashing checks in McDevitt & Sojourner’s 
sample may have paid to avoid overdrafts, a growing body of evidence 
suggests that overdraft usage sometimes also stems from the slow settlement of 
existing payment systems. In particular, the gap between a payment’s initiation 
and its settlement can open the door to confusion about account balances that 
can trigger overdraft charges—including those unfairly structured to penalize 
consumers with low balances. 
Take a transaction known as an “authorization positive, settlement 
negative” overdraft.84 This type of overdraft occurs when a payor authorizes a 
payment from an account that, at the time of authorization, had enough funds to 
cover the payment, but at the time of settlement does not. In some cases, the 
reduced balance is the result of a settlement lag on previous payments that had 
posted but were not yet reflected on the bank’s books. When that happens, the 
bank charges an overdraft fee. In a world without the initiation-settlement gap, 
these kinds of errors would never occur. 
Banks have also used byzantine payment-posting rules to exploit the 
confusion created by the gap.85 For instance, several recent class-action 
lawsuits have targeted the practice of ordering a day’s debit-card payments 
from greatest to smallest so that overdraft fees are maximized in the event of a 
day’s mistake.86 Though this practice is on the wane, it illustrates how the 
complexity of today’s payment processes opens unnecessary traps for the 
 
81. Id. at 22. 
82. See Ryan C. McDevitt & Aaron Sojourner, Policy Brief on Demand, Regulation, and 
Welfare on the Margin of Alternative Financial Services 2, 
https://sites.google.com/site/aaronsojourner/home/files/McDevitt%20Sojourner%202016%20Policy%20
brief.pdf?attredirects=0&d=1 [https://perma.cc/T5MX-HCR4]. If one assumes that many customers 
subsequently purchased money orders to make bill payments, then the true cost only rises higher. See 
McDevitt & Sojourner, supra note 78, at 19 (suggesting this possibility). 
83. See SERVON, supra note 73, at 19. 
84. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, DATA POINT: FREQUENT OVERDRAFTERS 29 (2017), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201708_cfpb_data-point_frequent-overdrafters.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J78A-4JCB]. 
85. See Tanisha M. Edwards, The Banking Shuffle: Barring the Reordering of Consumer 
Transactions and Other Recommendations, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 253, 253 (2016). 
86. See id. 
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unwary. Such traps sometimes lead people to sensibly eschew the mainstream 
banking system altogether.87 
The examples of check-cashing and overdraft demand illustrate the 
difficulties that slow settlement causes the poor. But slow settlement causes 
trouble for every participant in the economy. Managing inflow and outflow of 
funds; holding money in transaction accounts, rather than placing it in 
productive investment accounts—these types of (rational) actions are drains on 
the efficiency of households and businesses no matter their fundamental 
financial condition. For this reason, both the private sector and the public sector 
have sought, for years, to bring faster payment platforms into existence and 
widespread use.88 It is into this environment that FedNow, and the controversy 
surrounding it, arrives. 
C. Faster Payments and Interbank Settlement 
FedNow represents the Federal Reserve’s principal policy response to the 
problem of slow settlement. This Section presents an account of how the Fed 
has worked, and plans to work, “at the boundary” of prototypical 
administrative practice to bring it into existence.89 
FedNow has its roots in an effort to facilitate coordination among private-
sector financial institutions toward the goal of developing innovative faster 
payment platforms.90 The effort began in earnest in 2013, and it was motivated 
by the stark contrast between faster payment infrastructure gaining significant 
market share around the world and its near nonexistence in the United States.91 
Principally, it aimed at shifting expectations among market participants and 
creating focal points to hasten their agreement on viable designs.92 By 2015, 
the Fed had developed a broad and active collection of over three hundred 
institutions—banks, technology services providers, social-sector organizations, 
 
87. See SERVON, supra note 73. 
88. See, e.g., FED. RESERVE STAFF FOR THE PAYMENTS SYS. DEV. COMM., FED. RESERVE 
SYS., STAFF STUDY 175: THE FUTURE OF RETAIL ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS SYSTEMS: INDUSTRY 
INTERVIEWS AND ANALYSIS 12-15 (2002). 
89. Cf. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 853 
nn.47, 50 (2014) (characterizing the Fed as a “boundary organization”). 
90. See FED. RESERVE SYS., STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING THE PAYMENT SYSTEM 1 (Jan. 25, 
2015), https://fedpaymentsimprovement.org/wp-content/uploads/strategies-improving-us-payment-
system.pdf [https://perma.cc/BT6F-9WSK] (“Through this Strategies for Improving the U.S. Payment 
System paper, the Federal Reserve is calling on all stakeholders to seize this opportunity and join 
together to improve the payment system.”). 
91. See FED. RESERVE BANKS, PAYMENT SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT: CONSULTATION PAPER 3 
(Sept. 10, 2013) (identifying the lack of faster payments as a “[g]ap[]” in the United States payment 
infrastructure and contrasting it with “a world where several other countries are moving to ubiquitous 
near-real-time retail payment systems”). 
92. These types of coordination efforts are not unique to the Fed. See, e.g., Robert Ahdieh, 
The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578 (2010) 
(describing regulatory efforts to coordinate industrial networks). 
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and more—into a body called the Faster Payments Task Force.93 The dialogues 
hosted by the Task Force discussed varying private-sector ventures designed to 
support faster payments and also increasingly discussed specific changes and 
service offerings through which the Federal Reserve Banks might support the 
development of faster payments in the United States.94 
In the midst of this ferment, the private sector delivered. In 2017, a 
consortium of large banks inaugurated a new interbank platform called RTP 
(an acronym for real-time payments), which enables interbank settlement of 
small-dollar transfers between its member financial institutions.95 
RTP’s method of settlement is its key distinguishing feature. Recall from 
Section II.A that deferred net settlement poses a challenge to the growth of 
Zelle and other retail faster payment platforms. Though deferred net settlement 
is the predominant method by which retail payment providers handle their 
interbank payment obligations, it is not a technological necessity. There exists 
an alternative settlement model—real-time gross settlement.96 RTP operates a 
platform using this method.97 As the name suggests, it enables banks to settle 
their debts to each other in lockstep with the posting of transactions to their 
accountholders. That is, when a payee’s bank credits the payee’s account, it 
simultaneously receives its own payment from the payor’s bank. This 
eliminates the risk to the payee’s bank that the payor’s bank is not good for it. 
Real-time gross-settlement platforms have been around for half a 
century.98 Indeed, the Federal Reserve was the innovator, with the development 
of the first electronic real-time settlement system in the 1970s, called 
Fedwire.99 But Fedwire is designed to support high-value payments with high 
levels of security.100 It is not a cost-effective option for the settlement of 
payments made through a retail system like Zelle or its potential competitors. 
RTP aims to become exactly that. 
The RTP platform is a private-sector utility. It is owned and operated by 
The Clearing House—the same organization that owns and operates EPN (the 
private-sector ACH platform) and CHIPS (a private, large-value wire transfer 
platform).101 Upon gaining access to RTP, participating banks are able to send 
 
93. See FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, FED. RESERVE SYS., THE U.S. PATH TO FASTER 
PAYMENTS: FINAL REPORT PART ONE: THE FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE APPROACH (2018). 
94. See id. 
95. See David Heun, As New Real-Time Payments Go Live, Much Work Remains, AM. 
BANKER (Nov. 14, 2017). 
96. See Humphrey, supra note 45, at 421. 
97. See Heun, supra note 95. 
98. See Bech & Hobjin, supra note 46, at 151 
99. See id. 
100. See id. 
101. See Press Release, The Clearing House, First New Core Payments System in the U.S. in 
More Than 40 Years Initiates First Live Payments (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/payment-systems/articles/2017/11/20171114-rtp-first-new-core-
payments-system [https://perma.cc/72ZE-ZNSB]. 
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small-value, real-time payments to other banks, with instructions that enable 
real-time posting to accountholders at those banks.102 This means that banks 
offering Zelle (or other retail or business-to-business faster payment services) 
to their accountholders will be able to make real-time interbank settlements 
over RTP. At present, however, the system is in the early stages of 
development. While over fifty percent of bank accounts in the United States are 
held at banks that nominally participate in RTP, public reports suggest that 
nearly all transactions on the system in 2018 were test and demo transactions, 
and that “[a]doption through most of 2019 was rather tepid.”103 In other words, 
the network is still very much in its design phase. 
Just as the RTP effort got rolling, the Fed moved more forcefully into the 
fray. In August 2019, the Fed announced that, for the first time in over forty 
years, it planned to design and operate FedNow, a new payment platform in the 
United States.104 Assuming it becomes operational—a milestone tentatively 
scheduled for 2024—FedNow will function very similarly to RTP.105 It will 
facilitate real-time interbank transfers for low-dollar-value transactions—a 
Fedwire-style real-time gross settlement platform for the retail market. 
In doing so, the Fed explicitly set out to achieve goals associated with 
public options. Ganesh Sitaraman and Anne Alstott have recently identified 
five such goals: ”promoting opportunity, assisting business, improving market 
competition, advancing racial and geographic equity, and supporting 
democracy.”106 While FedNow does not aim to achieve all five in the way that 
say, a public library or a public healthcare option might, it nevertheless aims at 
three. First, in rolling out FedNow, the Fed emphasized its utility to 
businesses.107 Because managing cash inflows and outflows represents an 
essential (and costly) aspect of financial operations, a turn toward easier-to-
manage instantaneous payments holds the potential of reducing overhead 
across the productive economy. Second, the Fed pointed to FedNow’s potential 
contribution towards competition in the retail payments market. Because RTP 
is owned by a consortium of large retail banks, the Fed argued, it may fail to 
interoperate with competitive providers. FedNow might, the thinking went, 
facilitate broader participation by new market entrants.108 Finally, FedNow was 
 
102. See id. 
103. Steve Murphy, The Clearing House Is About to Triple the RTP Single Transaction Limit, 
PAYMENTSJOURNAL (Jan. 24, 2020); Real-Time Payment Volume Reaches Critical Point, ITREASURER: 
INTELLIGENCE FOR TREASURERS (Apr. 30, 2019), http://www.itreasurer.com/Real-Time-Payment-
Volume-Reaches-Critical-Point.aspx [https://perma.cc/439G-YSC3]. 
104. See Brainard, supra note 7 (announcing the plan); Federal Reserve Actions to Support 
Interbank Settlement of Faster Payments, Notice and Request for Comment, 84 Fed. Reg. 39297 (Aug. 
9, 2019) (issuing notice and requesting comment). 
105. See id. 
106. Sitaraman & Alstott, supra note 9, at 66. 
107. See Governor Lael Brainard, Bd. of Governors, Delivering Fast Payments for All, 
Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Town Hall (Aug. 5, 2019) (describing the potential 
utility of faster payments to merchants and small businesses). 
108. See id. 
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justified on grounds of hastening the cost-effective availability of retail faster 
payments to customers of financial institutions regardless of geography.109 
Taken together, these motivations led the Fed to decide to compete with The 
Clearing House’s RTP offering. 
D. A Public Option Under Scrutiny 
FedNow was met with praise from many constituencies—particularly 
community banks, retailers, and consumer advocacy organizations.110 But it 
also encountered opposition from many foes. Some criticized relatively 
technical details of the FedNow plan—its timeline for rollout, the data formats 
the system will use, whether it will be interoperable with RTP, and similar 
questions. But others aimed at the heart of the enterprise. 
Legally, antagonists ranging from a consortium of banks to the Wall 
Street Journal editorial page have argued that the plan potentially violates a 
landmark 1980 law, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act,111 the payment-related provisions of which then-Fed Chair Paul 
Volcker stated would “undoubtedly take their place as the most important 
pieces of financial legislation enacted in this century.”112 This law established 
rules regarding the Fed’s payment offerings that some have asserted prohibit 
competition in payment markets that are already being served by the private 
sector. In particular, its provisions govern the ways that the Fed prices the 
payment services offered by the Reserve Banks. 
The main change to the payment system wrought by the MCA was the 
requirement that payment services previously available without cost to Federal 
 
109. See id. (“Accessibility means serving more than 10,000 banks of varying sizes and 
missions that are in communities all around the country.”). 
110. See, e.g., Jesse Hamilton, Fed’s Real-Time Payments System to Compete with Wall 
Street, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-05/fed-plans-
real-time-payments-system-to-compete-with-wall-street [https://perma.cc/SZ7M-6YWQ] (describing 
praise from Senator Elizabeth Warren); Pete Schroeder, Fed to Develop Real-Time Payments System for 
Launch in 2023-2024, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-
payments/fed-to-develop-real-time-payments-system-for-launch-in-2023-or-2024-idUSKCN1UV1XP 
[https://perma.cc/ZG3U-A9ZL] (describing praise from smaller banks); Jim Daly, Big Retailers 
Anticipate FedNow Will Bring Competition to Payments, DIGITAL TRANSACTIONS (Nov. 12, 2019), 
https://www.digitaltransactions.net/big-retailers-anticipate-fednow-will-bring-competition-to-payments 
[https://perma.cc/Z7JV-DBMA] (describing praise from retailers); Christina Tetrault, Comments In 
Support of the Federal Reserve Board’s Proposal to Build the FedNow Faster Payment System, 
CONSUMER REPORTS (Nov. 7, 2019), https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/research/comments-in-
support-of-the-federal-reserve-boards-proposal-to-build-the-fednow-faster-payment-system 
[https://perma.cc/RD8J-85DU]. 
111. See The Editorial Board, The Very Political Fed, supra note 17 (arguing that FedNow 
“flouts the law”); Correcting the Record on Real-Time Payments, BANK POL’Y INST. (Apr. 9, 2019), 
https://www.bpi.com/correcting-the-record-on-real-time-payments [https://perma.cc/4FQL-MTA] 
(arguing that the Monetary Control Act significantly constrains Fed discretion regarding FedNow’s 
operations). 
112. To Modernize the Federal Reserve System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic 
Monetary Policy of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. & Urban Affairs (May 15, 1980) (statement of Paul 
A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
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Reserve member banks had to be provided for fees “over the long run” that 
were “established on the basis of all direct and indirect costs actually incurred 
in providing Federal Reserve services.”113 These services include, among 
others, “check clearing and collection services, wire transfer services, 
automated clearinghouse services, settlement services, securities safekeeping 
services, Federal Reserve float, and any new services which the Federal 
Reserve System offers, including but not limited to payment services to 
effectuate the electronic transfer of funds.”114 
The most categorical argument put forth by FedNow’s opponents is that 
the MCA outright prohibits the Fed from providing a service that would 
compete directly with an already-existing private service.115 As former 
Congressman Ron Paul has put it, in trenching on the private sector’s 
established turf, the Fed would be “decid[ing] to disobey the will of its 
creator—Congress.”116 The argument that Congress has forbidden the Fed from 
competing against private-sector payments systems has also been raised 
explicitly by the Competitive Enterprise Institute and the American Action 
Forum.117 
A subtler—but perhaps more consequential—argument is that the MCA 
and longstanding interpretations of the MCA impose substantial constraints on 
the operational characteristics of new Fed payment services. These are 
constraints that, critics suggest, might be tight enough to effectively render the 
FedNow plan in its currently-debated form inconsistent with longstanding Fed 
policy.118 This criticism has been aired by moderate voices, such as George 
Selgin of the Mercatus Center and Steven Kenneally of the American Bankers 
Association, who ground their allegations of illegality in arguments from the 
Fed’s own post-MCA payment-system criteria.119 
 
113. 12 U.S.C. § 248a (2018). 
114. Id. § 248a(b)(8). 
115. See Paul, supra note 16 (arguing that, “per congressional mandate, the Fed must step 
back” because private operators already offer real-time payments); John Berlau, Defiance of Congress 
Melts Federal Reserve Credibility, COMPETITIVE ENT. INST. (July 11, 2019), 
https://www.cei.org/blog/defiance-congress-melts-federal-reserve-credibility [https://perma.cc/BB3E-
DBGQ] (stating that the MCA’s “legislative ban would seem to apply” to the RTP controversy “because 
. . . the Fed’s proposal will directly compete with the private sector’s established Real-Time Payments 
system and additional emerging technologies”); cf. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, A Stealth Topic for the 
Chairman, AM. ACTION FORUM (July 11, 2019), https://www.americanactionforum.org/daily-dish/a-
stealth-topic-for-the-chairman [https://perma.cc/E4W9-GF4T] (“The [MCA] requires the Fed first show 
a market failure in the provision of real-time payments; no such evidence exists.”). 
116. See Paul, supra note 16. 
117. See Berlau, supra note 115 (arguing that the MCA’s restrictions prohibit the construction 
of a Fed system “to process real-time electronic payments”); Thomas Wade, The Fed and Real-Time 
Payments, THE DAILY DISH (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.americanactionforum.org/daily-dish/the-fed-
and-real-time-payments [https://perma.cc/Q7N5-4Q2C] (arguing that “a real-time payments platform 
appears to be outside of the Fed’s legal mandate”). 
118. See id. 
119. See Stephen Kenneally, Senior Vice President, Am. Bankers Ass’n, Comment Letter on 
Potential Federal Reserve Action to Support Interbank Settlement of Faster Payments 6-7 (Dec. 10. 
2018) (analyzing the MCA and “the Federal Reserve’s longstanding policy regarding the provision of 
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Judging by recent activity on Capitol Hill, the fusillade of public 
advocacy is having its desired effect. As congressional testimony from 
Chairman Powell revealed in 2019, FedNow’s legality under the MCA was a 
key point of deliberation in the run-up to its announcement.120 As a matter of 
prudence, the Fed is right to be concerned. Two courts have suggested that the 
MCA creates a private right of action for depository institutions and private 
payment-system operators who are aggrieved by Fed-payment-system 
developments.121 And the Fed, as always, is sensitive to perceptions of 
engaging in political conduct, inviting scrutiny of its independence.122 
Beyond interpretations of the MCA and subsequent Fed administrative 
precedent, some critics have also argued that strong limits on new Fed 
competition in the payments market should be made explicit via legislation. 
This position is summed up by the slogan, “[t]he government should be the 
umpire, not the opposing team.”123 Motivated by this view, some Senators have 
indeed raised the possibility of explicitly prohibiting the construction of 
FedNow.124 
These critiques sound against the idea of a public option—even one that 
operates interbank, rather than in direct connection with end-users—and they 
also sound against the hybrid reality of the Fed as an agency that spans the 
public-private divide. The next Part addresses them. 
 
payment services”); George Selgin, Round One: What Role Should the Federal Reserve Play In 
Developing a Faster Payment System?, THE BRIDGE (Apr. 25, 2019), 
https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/round-one-what-role-should-federal-reserve-play-
developing-faster-payments-system [https://perma.cc/RQ3E-GTHC] (“In so far as the proposed [Real-
Time Gross Settlement] system provides no essential public benefit ‘that other providers alone cannot be 
expected to provide with reasonable effectiveness, scope, and equity,’ its establishment would be 
contrary to the criteria set forth by the 1980 Monetary Control Act.” (quoting BD. OF GOVERNORS OF 
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., POLICIES: THE FEDERAL RESERVE IN THE PAYMENTS SYSTEM (1990)); see also 
Kelly S. King, Chairman and CEO, BB&T Corp., Comment Letter on Potential Federal Reserve Action 
to Support Interbank Settlement of Faster Payments 1 (Dec. 12, 2018) (citing “statutory requirements 
and long-standing principles” that would prohibit the provision of “a new real-time gross settlement 
(‘RTGS’) service” by the Fed); cf. R.J. Lehmann, Jerome Powell Should Tread Cautiously with Real-
Time Payments Proposal, WASH. EXAMINER (July 15, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/federal-reserve-chair-jerome-powell-should-tread-
cautiously-with-real-time-payments-proposal [https://perma.cc/5HRZ-QNCT] (arguing that FedNow 
would run afoul of the MCA and mistakenly quoting the Fed Payment System Policy as the MCA); 
Nat’l Taxpayers Union et al., An Open Letter to Members of Congress: Stop the Fed’s Real-Time 
Payment Takeover (May 1, 2019) (same); Wade, supra note 117 (same). 
120. See Lehman, supra note 119 (describing Chairman Powell’s testimony). 
121. See Jet Courier Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 713 F.2d 1221, 1224 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(implying that private payment-system operators and financial institutions fall within the zone of 
interests established by the MCA); Bank Stationers Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
704 F.2d 1233, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 1983) (same). 
122. See, e.g., CONTI-BROWN, supra note 6, at 179-217. 
123. Business Coalition for Fair Competition, Comment Letter on Federal Reserve Actions to 
Support Interbank Settlement of Faster Payments, at 2 (Nov. 7, 2019). 
124. See Neil Haggerty, GOP Senators Skeptical of Fed’s Faster Payments Network, AM. 
BANKER (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/gop-senators-skeptical-of-feds-faster-
payments-network [https://perma.cc/7H7W-ZRCF] (“Sen. Pat Toomey . . . said he thinks Congress 
should potentially step in to try to block the launch of FedNow.”). 
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III. The Fed’s Public Options: Law, History, and Theory 
In taking aim at FedNow, its critics target a longstanding aspect of the 
Fed’s hybrid structure. This structure may have arisen through contingencies of 
politics, personality, and history, but it has not evolved into a mistake. To the 
contrary, the Fed’s hybrid role in the payment system serves a range of policy 
functions, each of which would be served by a well-designed version of 
FedNow. In this Section, we argue that service of these policy functions 
justifies the Fed’s continuing involvement in the payment system, as a provider 
of public options. 
In advancing these justifications, we elaborate a set of contextual reasons 
to support public options that builds on, and differs from, the theory recently 
put forth by Ganesh Sitaraman and Anne Alstott.125 In their work, Sitaraman 
and Alstott articulate five rationales for public options: “promoting 
opportunity, assisting businesses, improving market competition, advancing 
racial and geographic equity, and supporting democracy.”126 We show that, in 
the case of payments, public options are justified even on narrower grounds. 
Specifically, we identify promoting innovation, promoting access, and 
providing resilient interbank platforms as contextual justifications for public 
payment options. Taken together, these goods redound to advance equity, assist 
businesses, and promote opportunity at one level of remove. 
A. The Origins of the Public-Private Hybrid 
History reveals that the Federal Reserve System was created in part to 
remedy perceived flaws in payment resolution. Further, the Fed’s framers 
serendipitously succeeded: Over the decades of the twentieth century, the 
United States rose to become a leader in payment system design.127 Through 
the 1970s, the United States boasted one of the most technologically 
sophisticated payments systems in the world, developed largely as a 
collaboration between the Federal Reserve and the private sector. 
Simultaneously, Congress consistently emphasized payment-system 
development as a central mission of the Federal Reserve, and consistently 
allocated responsibility to the Fed in tandem with the private sector. The Fed 
has always been both participant in and supervisor of the system. Advocating 
 
125. See Sitaraman & Alstott, supra note 9, at 24-43. 
126. Id. at 66. 
127. See, e.g., Morten L. Bech & Bart Hobijn, Technology Diffusion within Central Banking: 
The Case of Real-Time Gross Settlement, 3 INT’L J. CENTRAL BANKING 147, 151 (2007) (describing 
how the United States—and especially the Federal Reserve’s Fedwire system—provided global 
templates for interbank payment system design). As tempting as it is to credit the vision of these 
legislative designers, the reality is that the Fed and United States triumphed in this regard due in no 
small part to the obliteration of the European powers during the First and Second World Wars (hence 
the serendipity). 
08. CONTI-BROWN & WISHNICK ARTICLE. OFFICER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2020  9:28 PM 
The Payment System 
407 
 
for the Fed to continue on this dual path, as we do below, is thus consistent 
with historical precedent. 
The passage of the Federal Reserve Act has been much studied and 
discussed,128 often focusing on how its leading proponents created a system 
that would honor the anti-central-bank legacy of Jacksonian politics while also 
rendering a creaky banking system more coherent.129 The Federal Reserve Act, 
however, is much more than this. For purposes of studying the payment 
system, two realities are important: First, the legislative framers were focused 
intently on the failures of payment clearing in the years prior to the Fed’s 
formation. Second, the Fed is a compromise between public and private 
interests, such that it was designed, from the beginning, to be both participant 
in and supervisor of the payment system. 
Before the Fed existed, payments in the United States were a complicated 
affair. Banks were largely restricted to in-state business because of state and 
federal prohibitions on interstate banking.130 Banks were also often restricted to 
a single office in a state. Of the 25,000 banks that existed in 1913,131 only 
roughly 397 had branches.132 A banking system built on these decentralized 
foundations meant that the networks that facilitated the clearing and settlement 
of checks—by far the leading payment method at the time—were a mess.133 
With 25,000 independently chartered banks, the sheer number of endpoints to 
the checking network made things bad enough.134 But the difficulties of 
transmitting check payments were made worse by the fact that nearly 10,000 of 
 
128. Reflections began nearly immediately after its passage. See, e.g., CARTER GLASS, AN 
ADVENTURE IN CONSTRUCTIVE FINANCE (1927); PAUL M. WARBURG, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: 
ITS ORIGINS AND GROWTH (1930); HENRY PARKER WILLIS, THE FEDERAL RESERVE: A STUDY OF THE 
BANKING SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES (1915). They continue in recent histories exploring the 
implications of the founding for the present. See, e.g., ROGER LOWENSTEIN, AMERICA’S BANK: THE 
EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2015); Nadav Orian Peer, Negotiating the Lender 
of Last Resort: The 1913 Federal Reserve Act as a Debate Over Credit Distribution, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
BUS. 367 (2019). 
129. For the impact of Jacksonian skepticism of central banks on the founding of the Federal 
Reserve, see LOWENSTEIN, supra note 128, at 98, 140; and Peter Conti-Brown, Central Banking and 
Institutional Change in the United States: Punctuated Equilibrium in the Development of Money, 
Finance, and Banking, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CENTRAL BANKING (Peter Conti-Brown & Rosa 
Lastra eds., 2018). 
130. See COMM. ON BRANCH, GROUP & CHAIN BANKING, FED. RESERVE SYS., BRANCH 
BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 52-68 (July 1937) 
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/federal%20reserve%20history/frcom_br_gp_ch_banking
/branch_banking_us.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q94Z-JXUU]. 
131. Paul M. Connolly & Robert W. Eisenmenger, The Role of the Federal Reserve in the 
Payments System, in THE EVOLUTION OF MONETARY POLICY AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
OVER THE PAST THIRTY YEARS: A CONFERENCE IN HONOR OF FRANK E. MORRIS 131, 132 (Richard W. 
Kopcke & Lynn E. Browne eds., 2000). 
132. See COMM. ON BRANCH, GROUP & CHAIN BANKING, supra note 130, at 3. 
133. See, e.g., WALTER E. SPAHR, THE CLEARING AND COLLECTION OF CHECKS 105-06 
(1926). 
134. See Stephen Haber, Political Institutions and Financial Development: Evidence from the 
Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Mexico and the United States, in POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 18 (Stephen H. Haber, Douglass C. North, & Barry R. Weingast eds., 
2008). 
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these banks also imposed extra “exchange charges” on checks presented from 
some of their peers.135 
In response to this morass, Congress aimed at facilitating national—and 
even international—payment coordination through the Federal Reserve System. 
Providing an “elastic currency,” as Congress wrote in the Federal Reserve 
Act’s chapeau paragraph, was meant to ensure the availability of credit in part, 
but also the technical capabilities of delivering that credit. Indeed, by the 
1920s, the Fed had become a dominant player in the clearing of checks, 
clearing fifty percent of checks in the United States, despite only twenty-nine 
percent of banks being members in the Federal Reserve System.136 Its banks 
became hubs of payment activity. 
Further, Congress vested the Federal Reserve Banks with the authority to 
address the “exchange charges”—essentially fees for check-clearing for out-of-
state banks—that placed hindrances on the flow of payments.137 Early in its 
life, the Fed overplayed its hand by using that authority to refuse to honor 
exchange charges imposed by state law. The banks sued, and the Fed lost at the 
Supreme Court.138 But while it wasn’t until 1980 that the Fed saw this power 
fully restored,139 the fact of the Fed’s dual participant-supervisor role in the 
payment system is what gave rise to the controversy in the first place. That 
duality has been with the Fed since its founding. 
Nor is this duality an aberration limited to the Fed’s founding period. 
Throughout its existence, the Federal Reserve has embodied a balance between 
the exceptionally public Federal Reserve Board—with its monetary policy 
responsibilities—and the quasi-private Federal Reserve Banks—anchored in 
the private sector, implementing the System’s policy through market operations 
subject to supervision by the Board.140 The balance of power has, of course, 
ebbed and flowed. For instance, after the 1932 election ushered in the FDR 
Administration, the New Deal, and the Hundred Days, the Fed’s powers were 
reorganized in 1933,141 followed by its restructuring in 1935 to promote the 
status of the public Board of Governors and demote the status of the Federal 
 
135. See Howard H. Preston, The Federal Reserve Banks’ System of Par Collections, 28 J. 
POL. ECON. 565, 571 (1920) (stating that 19,021 banks out of approximately 29,000 commercial banks 
in the country paid checks at par by 1918). 
136. R. Alton Gilbert, Effects of Federal Reserve Services on the Efficiency of the System for 
Collecting Checks in the United States, 1915 to 1930, at 14 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working 
Paper 99-014A, 1999), http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/1999/99-014.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR2M-
NCH4]. 
137. See Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 16, 38 Stat. 251, 258 (1913). 
138. See Walter Wyatt, The Par Clearance Controversy, 30 VA. L. REV. 361, 383-90 (1944) 
(discussing Farmers & Merchants’ Bank v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 262 U.S. 649 (1923) 
(Brandeis, J.)). 
139. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
140. For more on the role of the Reserve Banks, see SARAH BINDER & MARK SPINDEL, THE 
MYTH OF INDEPENDENCE: HOW CONGRESS GOVERNS THE FEDERAL RESERVE 61-80 (2016). 
141. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). 
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Reserve Banks.142 Even so, Congress made a strategic choice not to end the 
public-private partnership at the core of the Federal Reserve System. That 
remained, albeit in altered form. The Reserve Banks continued to work through 
the markets as a both regulators and participants. 
B. Public-Private Entrenchment Through the MCA 
Throughout the years running from the New Deal to the deregulatory 
efforts of the 1970s and 1980s, the Fed’s powers altered in myriad ways, but 
the fundamental payments hybridity remained. This carried forth even into the 
era of deregulation and privatization begun the late 1970s. The piece of 
legislation reframing the Fed’s role in the payment system in light of these 
secular currents concerning economic regulation, the MCA, arrived in 1980.143 
Its provisions govern the ways that the Fed may—and must—price the 
payment services the Reserve Banks provide to the private sector, and the ways 
it must supervise the payment system. 
Despite the deregulatory environment in which it was passed, the MCA 
reinforced the public-private hybrid model animating the Fed’s payment 
system involvement rather than dismantling it. The main change to the payment 
system wrought by the MCA was the requirement that payment services 
previously available without cost to Federal Reserve member banks had to be 
provided for fees “over the long run” that were “established on the basis of all 
direct and indirect costs actually incurred in providing Federal Reserve 
services.”144 These services include, among others, “check clearing and 
collection services, wire transfer services, automated clearinghouse services, 
settlement services, securities safekeeping services, Federal Reserve float, and 
any new services which the Federal Reserve System offers, including but not 
limited to payment services to effectuate the electronic transfer of funds.”145 
The Act also includes the authority to expand the Fed’s oversight of financial 
institutions’ reporting requirements,146 reserve requirements,147 and a variety of 
other rulemaking authority.148 
Payments, then, are not only at the core of the MCA—they also constitute 
the lion’s share of covered services under the MCA. The preservation of the 
 
142. Pub. L. No. 74-305, 49 Stat. 684 (1935). 
143. Pub L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980). For an excellent overview of the MCA priced 
services debate in the context of cannabis banking, see Julie Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597 (2015). 
144. 12 U.S.C. § 248a (2018). 
145. Id. § 248a(b)(8). 
146. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 102, 94 Stat. 132, 132 (1980) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 
461) (amending Section 11(a) of the Federal Reserve Act). 
147. Id. § 103, 94 Stat. at 133 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1813) (amending Section 
19(b) of the Federal Reserve Act). 
148. See, e.g., id. § 103, 94 Stat. at 135 (authorizing regulations governing Earnings 
Participation Accounts). 
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public-private partnership in payments is the motivating ethos of the statute. 
This is not an accident. The reason Congress acted was that the patchwork of 
payment services offered by the Fed was only available to member banks, and 
sometimes for free, which put other kinds of institutions at a competitive 
disadvantage and strained the financial viability of these services.149 The MCA 
left the Fed in its role as an active participant in the payment system, but set 
forth a goal of creating an equal playing field for member and nonmember 
depository institutions. 
The decades since the MCA have not been without congressional and 
regulatory development on payments. But at no point since the MCA has 
Congress relaxed the public-private partnership at the payment system’s core. 
As mentioned in Section II.B above, FedNow’s critics have cast some of 
their arguments in terms of the MCA’s cost-recovery requirements, and in 
terms of the Fed’s own articulation of those standards in administrative policy. 
Despite the seriousness of these critic’s arguments, they have been raised in a 
relative vacuum. To date, no courts have applied the substantive provisions of 
the MCA’s constraints on Fed payment system operations, and legal scholars 
have given the provisions scant treatment.150 One task of our analysis, then, is 
to provide an explanation of the MCA’s role in structuring the relationship 
between the Fed and the private sector. 
At the outset, before turning to our affirmative justifications for the Fed’s 
hybrid role, we must dispatch with the categorical argument that the MCA 
forbids the Fed from providing a service that would compete directly with an 
already-existing private service.151 This argument fails as a matter of law and 
rests on a misreading of the text and purpose of the MCA. The MCA requires 
the Fed to charge principle-based prices for its payment services, including 
“any new services which the Federal Reserve System offers, including but not 
limited to payment services to effectuate the electronic transfer of funds.”152 
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, the MCA delineates a set of services 
that must be covered by explicit prices.153 Second, the MCA tasks the Fed with 
 
149. Anatoli Kuprianov, The Monetary Control Act and the Role of the Federal Reserve in the 
Interbank Clearing Market, ECON. REV., July-Aug. 1985, at 23-24. 
150. While Jet Courier Services, Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 713 F.2d 1221, 1222-27 (6th 
Cir. 1983), and Bank Stationers Ass’n v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 704 F.2d 
1233, 1234-37 (11th Cir. 1983), do discuss the MCA’s cost-recovery provision, each discussion informs 
a threshold analysis of whether plaintiffs possess prudential standing under the MCA. Regarding 
scholarly attention, notable exceptions, whose brief but valuable discussions our analysis builds on, 
include: Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, Orders and Incentives as Regulatory Methods: The 
Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1115 (1987); Fred H. Miller, Robert G. 
Ballen & Hal S. Scott, Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and Collections, and Commercial Electronic 
Fund Transfers, 39 BUS. LAW. 1333 (1984); and David G. Oedel, Private Interbank Discipline, 16 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 327 (1993) (implying that private payment-system operators and financial 
institutions fall within the zone of interests established by the MCA). 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 115-117. 
152. 12 U.S.C. § 248a(c)(3) (2018). 
153. See id. § 248a(b). 
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developing a set of prices for each service that is based on a set enumerated 
principles.154 Finally, the statute sets forth a notice-and-comment procedure for 
the promulgation of the prices developed according to these principles.155 
Taken together, the three components of MCA’s payment provision govern the 
manner in which new services are offered to depository institutions. 
Importantly, these principles not only say nothing about barring the Fed from 
offering new services: they specifically envision that the Fed will make new 
services.156 The categorical argument thus has no place in statutory text. 
Nor, contra FedNow’s critics, does it have a place in the Fed’s own 
administrative policy developed to interpret and apply the MCA’s provisions. 
If this were the case, FedNow might be susceptible to Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) challenge.157 But these arguments from longstanding 
policy also are not compelling. The Fed’s criteria are (i) the ability to recover 
the platform’s costs “over the long run,” (ii) the expectation that the platform 
will provide a “clear public benefit,” and (iii) that the service is “one that other 
providers alone cannot be expected to provide with reasonable effectiveness, 
scope, and equity.”158 We assume for the purposes of argument that the Fed is 
capable of pricing to achieve cost-recovery reasonably well, as it has done for 
Fedwire and ACH for decades.159 The latter two criteria, we address in the 
subsequent sections. Throughout the subsequent sections, we explain why a 
world with FedNow would likely contain greater payment-system innovation, 
access, and stability than would be expected in an RTP-only world. These are 
clear public benefits, and they would result in the achievement of greater 
effectiveness, scope, and equity for faster payments than would likely be 
obtained in an RTP-only environment. 
C. The Fed as Promoter of Innovation 
The first reason that Federal Reserve public options are capable of 
delivering public benefits above and beyond a sole private provider alone has 
 
154. See id. § 248a(c). 
155. See id. § 248a(a). 
156. As discussed supra Section II.A, the ambit of the statutory authority enabling entry is 
quite broad. See id. §§ 248-1, 248a, 342, 464. 
157. See, e.g., Am. Wild Horse Pres. Campaign v. Perdue, 873 F.3d 914, 923 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(“A central principle of administrative law is that, when an agency decides to depart from decades-long 
past practices and official policies, the agency must at a minimum acknowledge the change and offer a 
reasoned explanation for it.”); Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 
1970) (“[A]n agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies 
and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored.”). 
158. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., POLICIES: THE FEDERAL RESERVE IN 
THE PAYMENTS SYSTEM (1990). 
159. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-614, PAYMENT SERVICES: FEDERAL 
RESERVE’S COMPETITION WITH OTHER PROVIDERS BENEFITS CUSTOMERS BUT ADDITIONAL REVIEWS 
COULD INCREASE ASSURANCE OF COST ACCURACY (2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679388.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LG6E-WRYF] (finding that the Fed has adhered reasonably well to its statutory 
responsibility to compete fairly with the private sector). 
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to do with innovation. As Fed Governor Lael Brainard stated when announcing 
the FedNow notice, “The FedNow Service will provide a neutral foundation for 
innovation . . . in end-user faster payment services. . . . [T]he addition of the 
FedNow Service could provide a springboard for broader private-sector 
participation in the development of innovative end-user services.”160 This 
emphasis on innovation does not represent a departure from prior Fed roles in 
the payment system; to the contrary, it represents an extension of a 
longstanding and beneficial role into the digital age. 
The Fed has long offered tactical, in-kind subsidies to support the 
development of payment innovations. In doing so, the Fed helps solve the free-
rider problem associated with innovation—that it creates positive knowledge 
spillovers that are not internalized by the innovator, thus leading profit-seeking 
actors to underinvest in research and development.161 This situation is 
especially acute in the context of the payment system because intellectual 
property protections are essentially absent from the core network technologies 
around which new payment systems are likely to coalesce.162 As a result, 
investment in research and development by the Fed—a public actor operating 
on a range of administrative, not profit-oriented motives—can fill the gap 
produced by a dearth of private-market innovation incentives. 
At the same time, the Fed has also acted as a standards coordinator for the 
network of payment-facilitating financial institutions. In the payments context, 
standards-coordination encompasses situations where “a central authority 
coordinates the operational and technical standards of payments intermediaries 
to ensure their mutual compatibility.”163 Because the successful diffusion of 
payment innovations typically requires mutual adoption among payors and 
payees across the financial network, coordination in deciding which among 
multiple competing options is valuable in stewarding the network to a new 
standard choice.164 
 
160. Brainard, supra note 107. 
161. As a recent review of conventional economic theory explains that “knowledge spillovers 
are the central market failure on which economists have focused when justifying government 
intervention in innovation. If one firm creates something truly innovative, this knowledge may spill over 
to other firms that either copy or learn from the original research—without having to pay the full 
research and development costs.” Nicholas Bloom, John Van Reenen & Heidi Williams, A Toolkit of 
Policies to Promote Innovation, 33 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 163, 166 (2019). Market failures from 
knowledge spillover arises from the transit of information through commercial society. “Ideas are 
promiscuous; even with a well-designed intellectual property system, the benefits of new ideas are 
difficult to monetize in full.” Id. 
162. Computer-based systems designed to facilitate payments are ineligible for patents under 
U.S. Supreme Court doctrine. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
163. John A. James & David F. Weiman, Financial Clearing Systems, in THE LIMITS OF 
MARKET ORGANIZATION 128 (Richard Nelson ed. 2005). 
164. John James and David Weiman state: 
Like all major innovations, the early adoption of network technologies is limited by relatively 
high costs and low uncertain returns. The latter, however, are magnified by the availability of 
multiple, incompatible formats. Consequently, the user base may be too small and narrow—
that is, below a critical mass—to generate demand externalities that would enhance its value 
to potential adopters and so spur more rapid diffusion. While the resulting delays in diffusion 
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In multiple instances, the Fed has both provided in-kind subsidies to 
innovation and served as standards coordinator to adopt promising innovations. 
This one-two punch demonstrates the value of public-private hybridity. 
First, consider the role played by the Fed in the development of magnetic-
ink character recognition technology for checks. In 1954, at the encouragement 
of the Fed, the American Bankers Association (ABA) created a committee of 
bankers “charged with creating a nationwide check processing system to sort 
checks electronically.”165 To support its work, the committee visited the 
leading technology companies of the day, including IBM, Pitney-Bowes, 
National Cash Register, and Stanford Research International, to survey 
possibilities for a standardized system of machine-reading.166 After two years 
of information-gathering sojourns and deliberations, the committee chose 
Stanford Research International’s Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR) 
system for encoding routing numbers, account numbers, and dollar amounts 
into a machine-readable language printed on the face of standards checks.167 
Nontrivial technical hurdles stood in the way of bringing this standard into 
widespread use. The committee needed technology that would permit machine 
reading through “over-stamping, pencil and ink markings, oils, greases, carbon 
smudges and Scotch and opaque tape as well as most other foreign 
substances.”168 Magnetic ink carried the day despite, in one commentator’s 
view, the “many mundane yet formidable obstacles to establishment of a 
standard that would advance the overall payments system.”169 
To press for development and diffusion of MICR, the Fed did more than 
just consult on this committee’s findings, although it was an active participant 
in those discussions.170 It also subsidized the development of check-reading 
equipment through experimental collaboration with five Federal Reserve 
Banks—New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, and San Francisco.171 It did 
so by paying above-market lease rates for the machines, devoting staff time to 
collaboration on improving them, and by running a subset of daily check 
volumes through the machines to test them.172 Further, by the mid-1960s, the 
Federal Reserve Banks were giving clearing-speed guarantees on checks 
 
may represent a rational response to high adoption (and switching) costs, it may also be in the 
interest of a sufficient number of users if they act collectively but not if they act individually. 
Id. at 130. 
165. James L. McKenney, Developing a Common Machine Language for Banking: The ABA 
Technical Subcommittee Story, 17 IEEE ANN. HIST. COMPUT. 61, 62 (1995). 
166. See id. at 66-67 (noting that the Federal Reserve Board “encouraged the formation” of 
the committee). 
167. See id. at 67-68. 
168. Connolly & Eisenmenger, supra note 131, at 136 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
169. Id. 
170. See McKenney, supra note 165, at 66-67. 
171. Connolly & Eisenmenger, supra note 131, at 136-37. 
172. Id. 
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encoded with MICR while refraining from guaranteeing delivery times for 
manually-sorted checks—an effective prod to promote widespread adoption.173 
The result of the public-private MICR-development effort was a stunning 
success. By 1967, it was in near-universal use across the U.S. banking 
industry.174 As the scholar of information systems James McKenney put it, 
“[r]arely has a standard been adopted so quickly.”175 He chalked the success up 
to an “industry tradition of cooperation.”176 We would add that subsidies from 
the Fed helped support the innovation process. Remarkably (if ironically, as it 
exposes the failures of innovation in the interim), the system remains in use 
today, over sixty years after its test runs in the back offices of the Federal 
Reserve Banks. 
A few years later in 1968, the Fed began participating, alongside private 
industry, in the development and promotion of a second landmark payment 
innovation, the ACH payment platform introduced in Part I.177 The design of 
ACH was not meant to replace retail payments via checks and credit cards.178 
Instead, ACH was “designed for small, repetitious payments such as payrolls, 
mortgage installments, insurance premiums, and utility bills.”179 ACH, too, was 
supported by Fed subsidy, with the Fed playing a “catalytic role” in developing 
the system and driving its widespread adoption.180 
The subsidy came in two forms. First, the Fed took on the task of 
operating many local ACHs and invested in the infrastructure to do so without 
charging prices aimed at recoupment. In 1972, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco sponsored and began operating the first ACH system. Over the 
next few years, it began operating similar clearinghouses across the country, 
aiming to support the development of a national network in collaboration with 
the private sector.181 Second, the Fed also worked with multiple federal 
agencies that had large payrolls, including the Social Security Administration 
and the Defense Department, to “automate their widely disbursed but recurrent 
payments.”182 In doing so, “the Fed developed low-cost microelectronic 
 
173. See McKenney, supra note 165, at 70. 
174. See id. at 71. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. For an overview of the ACH and its history, see Terri Bradford, The Evolution of ACH, 
FED. RESERVE BANK KANSAS CITY (Dec. 2007), http://www.kc.frb.org/Publicat/PSR/Briefings/PSR-
BriefingDec07.pdf [https://perma.cc/69RB-WRJC]. 
178. For more on the rise of credit cards as a payment rail, see Huseyin Lelebici, The 
Evolution of Alternative Business Models and the Legitimization of Universal Credit Card Industry: 
Exploring the Contested Terrain Where History and Strategy Meet, 29 ADVANCES IN STRATEGIC 
MGMT. 117 (2012). 
179. James McAndrews, The Automated Clearinghouse System: Moving Toward Electronic 
Payment, BUS. REV., July-Aug. 1994, at 16. 
180. James & Weiman, supra note 163, at 131. 
181. See id. 
182. Id. 
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technology” that supported one-way payments to smaller banks.183 These initial 
development subsidies, and the support for adoption of the ACH standard 
provided by heavy federal payor usage led to the swift growth of a fully-
electronic competitor to the paper check. Today two ACH providers remain 
dominant: the Electronic Payments Network, run by the industry group The 
Clearing House, and the Federal Reserve’s own ACH system.184 
Though it is still early in the faster-payment-development process, one 
can imagine the Fed playing a similar role in its growth trajectory. While the 
Clearing House only operates with innovation and standards-coordination 
incentives that align with its owner-operators’ advantage, the Fed can import 
policy goals into its decision-making. In other words, the question of system 
design itself will impact the possibilities for innovation.185 Already, through the 
Faster Payments Task Force process, and through its emphasis on involvement 
as the provider of “a neutral platform for innovation,” the Fed has signaled its 
willingness to act as a check on any self-protective design decisions made by 
the RTP consortium.186 The Fed has made clear that it aims to open the door to 
innovators whose plans involve “use cases that undermine [the RTP] owners’ 
existing interests and profits from traditional payment methods.”187 Further, the 
Fed is likely to be more willing to experiment with payment-system designs 
that leverage the growing interest of prominent startups and tech companies in 
facilitating payments processes for the digital age. At the very least, it is 
reasonable for the Fed to base its foray into faster payments on the judgment 
that its participation will provide a broader set of innovation opportunities than 
the Clearing House would on its own. 
D. The Fed as Promoter of Access 
When announcing FedNow, Fed Governor Lael Brainard stated, 
“Everyone deserves the same ability to make and receive payments 
immediately and securely, and every bank deserves the same opportunity to 
offer that service to its community.”188 This goal is closest to the core of 
Sitaraman and Alstott’s account of the role of public options in the policy 
toolkit. They suggest that where access to a particular good or service functions 




185. Cf. Mike Konczal, No Discount: Comparing the Public Option to the Coupon Welfare 
State, NEW AM. FOUNDATION (Dec. 2012), https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/4165-no-discount-
comparing-the-public-option-to-the-coupon-welfare-state/Konczal_Mike_PublicOption_NAF_Dec
2012.73ec1576c8a14f248cf792a954387e36.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5AY-Z78F] (analyzing how public 
options can shift standards to achieve various qualities). 
186. See Brainard, supra note 107. 
187. Federal Reserve Actions to Support Interbank Settlement of Faster Payments, Notice and 
Request for Comment, 84 Fed. Reg. 39297, 39308 (Aug. 9, 2019). 
188. Brainard, supra note 107. 
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justified in considering public provision of the good or service.189 That is likely 
to be the case with regard to FedNow, which can be expected to exceed RTP on 
the metric of access. 
The Fed’s market-entry policy criteria reflect the MCA’s core 
commitment to widespread access to payment services across the country. In 
particular, the MCA mandates that the Fed’s interventions in the payment 
system “shall give due regard to competitive factors and the provision of an 
adequate level of such services nationwide.”190 The policy rationale behind this 
mandate is, in the words of Fred Miller, Robert Ballen, and Hal Scott, to 
“promote competitive equality among depositary institutions”—whether urban 
or rural, whether serving corporate depositors or small households, and whether 
member of the Fed or not.191 In this regard, the MCA carries forth the ideal of 
nationwide service that motivated the Fed’s initial entry into check-clearing 
upon its creation and the Fed’s early efforts to put an end to the practice of 
nonpar check-clearing.192 Under the MCA and the Fed’s policies adopted 
pursuant to it, a public option is legitimate if it reasonably can be expected to 
better promote widespread access to payment services than market options 
alone. 
To that end, the Fed is likely to promote adoption of faster payments 
among a set of banks (and, through them, their customers) that the Clearing 
House is less likely to serve well with its RTP service. This is due to the 
differing motivations of the two institutions. The Clearing House is mutually 
owned by twenty-four of the largest banks in the country—Bank of America, 
JPMorgan Chase & Co., CapitalOne, and more.193 These institutions are 
motivated to provide services that benefit themselves and entrench their market 
position.194 Their interest in serving smaller competitors—the long tail of the 
over ten thousand depository institutions that hold transaction accounts in the 
United States—is purely instrumental. While they have opened up access to 
RTP to smaller institutions, their incentives are to design and price access to 
the RTP system to shore up their competitive positions, not to maximize its 
adoption and usage among the long tail. 
By contrast, the Fed has both the ability and the incentive to affirmatively 
promote FedNow among the long tail of depository institutions. At present, the 
Fed has preexisting service connections with over ten thousand depository 
institutions spanning a wide range of small- and midsized banks, credit unions, 
 
189. See Sitaraman & Alstott, supra note 9, at 41, 45. 
190. 12 U.S.C. § 248a(c)(3) (2018) (articulating constraints on the Fed’s pricing decisions for 
payment services). 
191. Fred H. Miller, Robert G. Ballen & Hal S. Scott, Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and 
Collections, and Commercial Electronic Fund Transfers, 39 BUS. LAW. 1333, 1373 n.214 (1984). 
192. See supra Section III.A. 
193. See Owner Banks, THE CLEARING HOUSE, 
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/about/owner-banks [https://perma.cc/PEM3-VBBT]. 
194. Cf. Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (2015) (theorizing 
how intermediaries use informational and positional advantages to entrench themselves). 
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and large commercial institutions. These institutions form the core of its 
constituency, both directly and indirectly. Directly, member banks elect the 
supermajority of Federal Reserve Bank directors; these directors, in turn, 
determine who will serve as Federal Reserve Bank president in each of twelve 
districts. Member banks count in the thousands. Indirectly, member and 
nonmember financial institutions alike exert strong political influence at all 
levels of government. By serving them, the Fed shores up its political support. 
Further, it does so by serving them in ways that have nothing to do with 
favoring the competitive position of the largest commercial banks. 
Rather, the Fed is well-positioned to serve as a promoter of widespread 
adoption of faster payments among depository institutions (thereby providing 
greater access to their customers) via two means. First, the Fed has a 
longstanding track record of providing technical assistance to depository 
institutions through its Federal Reserve Bank Services operations to support 
policy goals. To the extent that the Fed prioritizes the adoption of faster 
payments through FedNow, it will be able to call on its services support 
resources to achieve the goal. 
Second, the Fed is also able to engage in short-term below-cost pricing to 
spur network adoption. As discussed in Section I.A, the adoption path for 
payment platforms presents classic chicken-and-egg challenges. One time-
tested strategy for bringing early adopters on board is to subsidize their early 
use of a new system. Just as transportation-network companies like Uber and 
Lyft subsidize the early participation of riders and drivers to promote network 
“ignition,” the Fed could do the same to garner early participation of payors 
and payees.195 Despite contrary assertions from critics,196 the Fed is able to do 
so under the MCA. While FedNow’s critics interpret the MCA as 
“prohibit[ing] the Federal Reserve from offering its payment services at a 
loss”197—that is, as a substantive “break-even” requirement on the Fed’s 
operations—the statutory rule is quite different. In reality, the MCA only 
requires the Board of Governors to establish a “schedule of fees” for most of 
the services the Federal Reserve Banks offer.198 While this schedule must 
reflect a motive of cost recovery, it need only do so “[o]ver the long run,” and 
the pursuit of that motive affirmatively must be tempered by “due regard to 
competitive factors and the provision of an adequate level of such services 
 
195. See Geoffrey Parker & Marshall Van Alstyne, Platform Strategy, in THE PALGRAVE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT (Mie Augier & David J. Teece eds., 2016) (“Platforms 
with substantial resources can entice users via subsidy to join the platform. Subsidies can be temporary 
penetration prices or permanent discounts and can take several forms.”). 
196. See, e.g., Correcting the Record on Real-Time Payments, supra note 111. 
197. See id. 
198. 12 U.S.C. § 248a(a) (2018). This fee schedule must cover all of the Banks’ major 
payment services: currency, coin, check-clearing and -collection, wire transfer, ACH, settlement 
services, “Federal Reserve float,” and “any new services which the Federal Reserve System offers, 
including but not limited to payment services to effectuate the electronic transfer of funds.” Id. § 
248a(b)(8). 
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nationwide.”199 This rule, then, accepts the possibility of short-run below-cost 
pricing to support the widespread adoption of a nascent payment network. 
FedNow’s critics rightly observe that this reading of the MCA gives the 
Fed the ability to engage in price-cutting competition with a private rival. But 
this is not a bug of Fed provision; rather, it is a central feature, approved by 
Congress precisely in line with these expectations. It furthers the crucial goal of 
curbing incentives that private monopolists like TCH might otherwise have to 
charge supracompetitive prices.200 And while FedNow’s critics view this power 
as ripe for abuse by an aggrandizing government agency, both the design of the 
MCA and the Fed’s self-imposed price-setting structure safeguard against 
egregious abuses.201 
Further, a startup-subsidy strategy for FedNow would be entirely 
consistent with the history of Fed’s early support for the ACH system, which 
was crucial to its early network formation. Regarding ACH, the Fed initially 
priced services in relation to expectations of mature system volume, not early-
stage volume. Over a multiyear period after the passage of the MCA, the Fed 
raised prices for ACH—but only gradually and in a manner consistent with the 
goal of promoting system adoption. Though the Fed has not engaged in similar 
tactical subsidies since, it also has not had a new system to subsidize since. 
And at a higher level of generality, the goal of widespread diffusion of 
advanced payment systems has a long history in Fed practice.202 Its role in the 
Fed’s own justification of FedNow thus places it in that lineage.203 
E. The Fed as Guarantor of Financial Stability 
The final virtue of a public option for interbank faster payments is its 
potential contribution to financial stability—the resilience of the financial 
system to stress, whether from economic events or operational breakdowns.204 
 
199. Id. § 248a(c). 
200. See Alan S. Frankel, Monopoly and Competition in the Supply and Exchange of Money, 
66 ANTITRUST L.J. 313 (1998) (evaluating the disciplining effect of competition on payment service-
providers). 
201 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 159. 
202. See also James & Weiman, supra note 163, at 131 (discussing the role of the Fed in 
“supply[ing] its critical clearing services to all depository institutions at competitive prices,” reflecting a 
policy of “guarantee[ing] all banks universal access to essential payments systems”). 
203. As Fed Governor Lael Brainard put it when unveiling FedNow, the system, if 
implemented well, can serve the goal of making faster payments “available to everyone.” Brainard, 
supra note 107. 
204. See Financial Stability, WORLD BANK, 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr/gfdr-2016/background/financial-stability 
[https://perma.cc/4Z4U-YMD9] (“There are numerous definitions of financial stability. Most of them 
have in common that financial stability is about the absence of system-wide episodes in which the 
financial system fails to function (crises). It is also about resilience of financial systems to stress.”); see 
also Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Stability” in Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1087 (2015) (providing a deep dive on the importance of financial stability regulation in the wake of the 
2007-2009 financial crisis). 
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Because the smooth functioning of the payment system is essential to 
commerce, its disruption can represent a critical blow to the economy and 
society.205 The presence of public options at the heart of the payment system 
helps reduce the risk and cost of those disruptions. 
First, the availability of a public option can help create an effective 
backstop to remedy the consequences of an outage or disruption. 
Straightforwardly, this backstop comes from the presence of a second set of 
network pathways between payors and payees—a valuable redundancy in a 
world where no advanced technological system operates with 100 percent 
reliability.206 Though not all banks are likely to be connected to one another via 
both RTP and FedNow, some will be. For those banks, the operational 
breakdown of one system would not halt the flow of funds between them. This 
backstop is widely perceived as useful in the ACH context, where some banks 
have determined that “the resiliency benefits [of having two connections] 
outweigh the cost of connecting to multiple services.”207 So, too, may it add a 
measure of stability to a world where faster payments have become ubiquitous. 
But the more important form of Fed backstop also comes in the form of a 
longstanding commitment to operational and financial support for the smooth 
functioning of the payment system. In a time of potential crisis, the Fed is 
uniquely poised to provide such support. For instance, the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks disrupted the checking system by requiring the grounding of 
planes that transmitted checks from city to city.208 In response to this massive 
disruption, the Fed extended credit to payee institutions on normal check-
availability schedules and also worked to get the system back into normal 
operation.209 
Second, the involvement of the Fed as a payment-system operator helps 
support its work as a broad, systemic supervisor. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 
the Fed has responsibility for supervising “systemically important” payment 
systems.210 The fundamental question in determining whether a payment 
platform is systemically important is whether its failure would impose 
intolerable negative externalities on noncreditors and nonshareholders—that is, 
 
205. See Rosa María Lastra, Systemic Risk, SIFIs, and Financial Stability, 6 CAPITAL 
MARKETS L.J. 197, 202 (2011) (“The risk of payment-system disruption is a core form of systemic 
risk—the risk to spillover effects that undermine smooth economic functioning.”). 
206. Cf. Jeffrey M. Lacker, Payment System Disruptions and the Federal Reserve Following 
September 11, 2001, at 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Working Paper 03-16, Dec. 23, 2003) 
(“[T]he probability of future interbank payment disturbances is not negligible. Despite substantial 
investments in reliability and security and impressive record of performance and innovation, the heavy 
dependence of interbank payment arrangements on automated payment processing and 
telecommunications links makes occasional technological malfunctions reasonably likely.”). 
207. Federal Reserve Actions to Support Interbank Settlement of Faster Payments, Notice and 
Request for Comment, 84 Fed. Reg. 39297, 39308 (Aug. 9, 2019). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. See 12 U.S.C. § 5464 (2018). 
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those who could not prepare themselves by contract for the event of failure.211 
At scale, both RTP and FedNow may pose just such systemic importance; they 
would transmit high volumes of payments, and the dependencies that financial 
institutions and accountholders would have on the system could become 
enormous. The virtue of public ownership of FedNow is that such systemic risk 
concerns pertaining to it, while not eliminated, will be monitored much more 
successfully than any designated entity (such as a future RTP) could be. 
The reason for this is in the nature of supervision. If RTP were to become 
systemically important, it would be subject to “enhanced prudential 
supervision,”212 where information about the risks of failure are intermediated 
through a supervisory relationship. Supervision is necessarily a game of 
informational asymmetries where the supervisor—in the case of RTP, the 
Fed—seeks information from the supervised entities that the supervised 
institutions have incentives to distort.213 
The ownership of FedNow by the Fed simply means that the supervisory 
connection that would obtain with regard to RTP already exists to a much 
greater extent. Rather than seeking to resolve the informational asymmetries 
through an at-times confrontational relationship, the Fed’s supervisory 
responsibilities are managerial and operational. This does not mean that 
FedNow cannot fail; it means that the Fed’s ability to manage systemic risks 
imposed by a giant actor in the payment system is much higher when the Fed 
owns the entity, rather than when it merely supervises it as a matter of public 
law. 
Further, the Fed’s ability to supervise RTP itself would be enhanced by 
owning and operating a competitor system. This is because the Fed would gain 
firsthand expertise on the types of risks that such systems encounter; through 
operational experience, the Fed would become more capable of canny 
supervision. For instance, what types of cyber risks will systems like RTP need 
to defend against? This is not hypothetical. Hackers have stolen hundreds of 
millions of dollars through fraud on interbank payment platforms in the recent 
past and continue to make similar efforts.214 If the Fed were only a supervisor 
of RTP, it would have some sense of the magnitude, type, and complexity of 
these cyberthreats. But if it operates FedNow, it will gain much more granular, 
useful information. With this information, it can inform its supervisory 
approach with regard to RTP and with regard to a wide range of similar 
cyberthreats across the financial system. In this way, public ownership serves 
 
211. Cf. Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV 409 (2012). 
212. 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2018). 
213. See Peter Conti-Brown & Sean Vanatta, Supervision, Discretion, and the Rule of Law 
(2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
214. Joshua Hammer, The Billion Dollar Bank Job, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 3, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/03/magazine/money-issue-bangladesh-billion-dollar-
bank-heist.html [https://perma.cc/PEM3-VBBT]. 
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as the ultimate “regulatory sandbox”—enabling regulators to understand the 
risks they are meant to control from the ground up. 
 
*  *  * 
The law, history, and theory of the Fed’s operational role in the payment 
system all have hybrid, public-private interaction at their core. The Fed’s work 
as a supporter of innovation, a proponent of widespread access to innovative 
payment networks, and a guarantor of financial stability has played out in the 
context of past public options; in turn, these public options have supported and 
served private actors in myriad ways. Of course, the Fed’s enthusiasm and 
efficacy in these roles has ebbed and flowed across the decades; we would not 
be lamenting the state of the U.S. payment system today otherwise. Our 
argument here should not be taken as a defense of the Fed’s actions at every 
stage of payment system development—far from it—but rather as a defense of 
the possibilities of public-private hybridity. The MCA recognized the virtues of 
this arrangement, and taken together, the prospects of promoting innovation, 
access, and financial stability through operation of FedNow not only place it 
squarely within the authority granted by the MCA but also make it an urgent 
project for the Fed.  
IV. Hybridity Beyond the Public Option: Regulatory and Market Strategies for 
Fed Support of Faster Payments 
To date, the Fed’s faster payment policy work has focused on FedNow. 
But the Fed ought not limit its efforts to FedNow, alone. In this Part, we argue 
that the Fed should consider using a range of complementary tactics to speed 
up the payment system. Specifically, we show how the Fed can use a collection 
of existing powers and authorities at varying levels of regulatory coercion to 
ensure that private-sector faster payments take root. These alternatives—fiscal 
agency, supervision, and regulation—are summarized in Figure 3.215  
 
 
215 We mean the concept of coercion formally and legally, as in the authority that the government 
has to enforce its will using the legal system. Fiscal agency is least coercive because it is about the 
highly discretionary methods the Fed uses on behalf of the public fisc to support the clearance and 
settlement of public payments. Supervision is more coercive, since supervisory activity can lead to 
enforcement actions, though it is less formally coercive than regulation. 
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Figure 3: Fed Strategies for Facilitating Private-Sector Faster Payments 
 
We argue that, by assigning each of these roles to the Fed, Congress has 
given the Fed significant tools to encourage—and even enforce—the speeding 
up of the the payment system. Remarkably, this conclusion cuts against the 
Fed’s own understanding of its authority. In its FedNow Notice and Request 
for Comment, the Fed wrote that it “does not have plenary regulatory or 
supervisory authority over the U.S. payment system and instead has 
traditionally influenced retail payment markets through its role as an 
operator.”216 It concludes—incorrectly, as we will argue—that “as has been the 
case with other retail payment systems, the Federal Reserve’s operational role 
as a provider of interbank settlement is the most effective approach to improve 
the prospects of ubiquitous, safe, and efficient faster payments in the United 
States.”217 In this Part, we show how incorrect the Fed is in this conclusion. We 
demonstrate the many ways that the Fed can promote the adoption of faster 
payments in the private sector by using tools well beyond direct payment-
platform operation. 
A. The Power of the Purse: Fiscal Agency 
The first tactic that the Fed can use to promote faster payments beyond the 
public option is to shift the payment activity of the federal government itself to 
new, faster platforms. By statute, under the direction of the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Federal Reserve Banks “act as fiscal agents of the United 
States.”218 Although this provision was included in the original enactment of 
the Federal Reserve Act,219 the Fed’s status as fiscal agent has evolved over 
time. According to the Fed’s most recent annual report, Reserve Banks act in 
their capacity as fiscal agents when they “auction Treasury securities, process 
 
216. Federal Reserve Actions to Support Interbank Settlement of Faster Payments, Notice and 
Request for Comment, 84 Fed. Reg. 39297, 39300 (Aug. 9, 2019). 
217. Id. 
218. 12 U.S.C. § 391 (2018). 
219. Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 15, 38 Stat. 251, 265 (1913). 
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electronic and check payments for the Treasury, collect funds owed to the 
federal government, maintain the Treasury’s operating cash account, and 
develop, operate, and maintain a number of automated systems to support the 
Treasury’s mission.”220 Through its role as fiscal agent, the Fed is essentially 
the U.S. government’s payment-making clerk. 
The Fed’s authority over the mechanisms it uses to facilitate government 
payments are untrammeled, except by any constitutional limitations. As a 
result, the Fed could decide immediately to push all of its government 
payments to faster systems. The potential dollar value that could be shifted is 
significant: in 2017, Social Security disbursements totaled $997 billion221 and 
military benefits totaled $146 billion.222 Allocation of these payments to a 
faster payment network would put the new payment network on the map. 
The connection between the Fed’s status as the government’s fiscal agent 
and innovations in the payment system has been tightly drawn in history. As 
the Fed itself has explained, it “became an ACH operator in large part because 
of the Reserve Banks’ role as fiscal agents of the U.S. Treasury.”223 The 
government’s appetite for technological innovation to facilitate the payments 
services that it provided—“particularly payrolls for military and civilian 
workers and benefit payments such as Social Security”—pushed the 
development of ACH forward. As the Fed’s retrospective assessment of the 
endeavor concludes, “[t]he combination of commercial and government ACH 
payments created economies of scale earlier than might otherwise have been 
the case, allowing the ACH to become a broadly used national service.”224 In 
other words, in the process of building the ACH network, the government itself 
served as one of the most important early adopters. And more recently, the Fed 
and the BFS have worked together to promote a complete transition to ACH 
Direct Deposit in lieu of paper checks.225 
Over forty years later, the Fed still largely uses ACH to provide fiscal 
services. As both the Fed and its private-sector critics have concluded, and as 
the pandemic welfare-disbursement debacle recently showed, the time has 
come to fully adapt the payment system to the Internet Age. Nascent faster 
payment platforms hold great promise, but they need volume to get off the 
 
220. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 105TH ANNUAL REPORT 91 (2018), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2018-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6ZX-
G65X]. 
221. Fast Facts & Figures about Social Security, 2018, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/fast_facts/2018/fast_facts18.html [https://perma.cc/T4RW-
JYZJ]. 
222. Defense Budget Materials - FY2018, OFFICE UNDER SECRETARY DEF., 
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/Budget2018 [https://perma.cc/NQ38-V4UQ]. 
223. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE: PURPOSES AND 
FUNCTIONS 121 (10th ed. 2016) [hereinafter PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS]. 
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ground.226 Through its fiscal agency, the Fed can prod the federal government 
to provide the volume.227 
B. The Power of Oversight: Supervision 
In addition to fiscal agency, the Fed might spur adoption of faster 
payments by employing supervisory prods. Supervision—distinct from 
regulation228—“involves monitoring, inspecting, and examining financial 
institutions” to ensure compliance with applicable laws and guarantee that 
financial institutions “operate[] in a safe and sound manner.”229 Distinct from 
regulatory processes governed by the Administrative Procedure Act,230 
supervision is a much more discretionary activity.231 Three forms of 
supervision could be leveraged to promote faster payment adoption: traditional 
bank supervision, enhanced supervision of “systemically important” financial 
institutions and market utilities, and supervision of private payment-platform 
operators under the little-studied Bank Services Company Act. 
 
226. The volume needed to build a successful platform or network is often thought of as 
achieving “critical mass.” See, e.g., David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Failure to Launch: 
Critical Mass in Platform Businesses, 9 REV. NETWORK ECON. 1 (2010). 
227. There are, of course, costs to switching from the ACH standard to the new, faster 
payment platforms. We make no claim as to the details of costs and benefits today, but rather propose 
that the Fed and BFS actively consider becoming early adopters of faster payments. 
228. Regulation “entails establishing the rules within which financial institutions must 
operate,” including “specific regulations and guidelines governing the formation, operations, activities 
and acquisitions of financial institutions.” PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 223, at 74. 
229. Id. 
230. See Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706. Regulation 
“entails establishing the rules within which financial institutions must operate,” including “specific 
regulations and guidelines governing the formation, operations, activities and acquisitions of financial 
institutions.” PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 223, at 74. 
231. For more on the distinction between regulation and supervision, see Rosa M. Lastra, The 
Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe, 10 COLUM. J. EURO. L. 49 
(2015) (distinguishing among governance, regulation, and supervision strategies in Europe). Although 
the terms “regulation” and “supervision” are often used interchangeably, a growing chorus of scholars 
have focused on the distinctions between these approaches. See, e.g., Jeremy Kress, Solving Banking’s 
‘Too Big To Manage’ Problem, 104 MINN. L. REV. 171 (2019); Lev Menand, Too Big to Supervise: The 
Rise of Financial Conglomerates and the Decline of Discretionary Oversight in Banking, 103 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1527 (2019); Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 369 (2019); Robert Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing 
Regulation, 99 MINN. L. REV. 329 (2014). For a discussion of the differences between supervision and 
regulation after Dodd-Frank, see Peter Conti-Brown, Stress Tests and the End of Bank Supervision, 
REGULATORY REV. (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.theregreview.org/2016/04/21/stress-tests-and-the-end-
of-bank-supervision [https://perma.cc/7GAK-5Z2V]. 
231. For a discussion of the competing epistemologies of bank supervision, see Conti-Brown 
& Vanatta, supra note 213. The discretionary elements of supervision are controversial. Guidance, 
Supervisory Expectations, and the Rule of Law: How do the Banking Agencies Regulate and Supervise 
Institutions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs (Apr. 30, 2019) 
(statement of Margaret Tahyar). 
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The Fed’s supervisory authority to promote faster payments is substantial 
and left primarily to its discretion. This authority exists on three levels.232 First, 
it stems from the Fed’s role as primary supervisor of Fed member banks (under 
the Federal Reserve Act) and bank and financial holding companies (under the 
Bank Holding Company Act and Gramm-Leach-Bliley), among other 
institutions. Second, the Fed enjoys enhanced supervisory authority over 
institutions and utilities deemed “systemically important” under the Dodd-
Frank Act. The third and most important authority the Fed has is over 
technology service providers under the little-studied Bank Services Company 
Act. The operation of the payment system involves all three areas of 
supervision. 
1. Supervision of Member Banks, Bank Holding Companies, and Foreign 
Bank Organizations 
The Fed’s traditional bank supervisory authority could be leveraged to 
promote faster payments without any alteration to its central institutional 
structures.  
The Fed’s bailiwick encompasses large bank holding companies, member 
banks in the Federal Reserve System, foreign banking organizations, and other 
U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks. Although it shares responsibility with others 
on the state and federal level,233 the Fed’s portfolio makes it arguably the most 
important bank supervisor in the United States.234 Indeed, bank holding 
companies now control over ninety-five percent of all banking assets in the 
United States.235 
To promote faster payment adoption among supervised institutions, the 
Fed could make use of its already-existing supervisory framework. For the 
relevant institutions within its supervisory bailiwick, the Fed conducts an 
annual “full-scope, on-site examination.”236 The examination focuses on what 
has been called “CAMELS+,” or a set of factors that include capital, assets 
 
232. The discussion in Section III.A about the Fed’s ability to influence real-time payment-
platform development through the Reserve Banks’ fiscal agency is in fact an argument about 
supervision, albeit via bank-shot. The Board of Governors has statutory supervisory authority over the 
Reserve Banks, including with respect to their performance as fiscal agents and, relatedly, as operators 
of payment systems. 12 U.S.C. § 248(j) (2018). 
233. See PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 223, at 76-77. 
234. See Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi & James Vickery, A Structural View of U.S. Bank 
Holding Companies, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. July 2012, at 65, 66. 
235. Id. 
236. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)(1) (2018). There are several exceptions to the annual review. For the 
largest financial institutions, the examination is “continuous.” See Supervision, FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/org_banksup.html [https://perma.cc/GBU4-NY24]. For 
state banks, federal examinations can occur every other year. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)(3). Some well-
managed banks are examined on an eighteen-month cycle. Id. § 1820(d)(4). 
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quality, management, earnings, liquidity, susceptibility to market risk, and 
other factors.237 
Pushing supervised entities toward faster payments could fit well within 
several of these supervisory categories, including management, liquidity, 
susceptibility to market risk, and especially whether each firms’ management is 
staying current with advances in information technology. Although supervisors 
within the Fed must follow the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System 
promulgated by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, the 
supervisors still maintain significant discretion to interpret it. A supervisor, 
then, could use examination to push individual banks toward greater adoption 
of faster payments with supervisory carrots and sticks traditionally at her 
disposal. 
Of course, the use of discretion has led some critics to urge the Fed to pull 
back and restore more of a sense of the “rule of law” in how supervisory 
relationships are structured.238 Relatedly, in 2018, President Trump signed into 
law the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act 
(EGRRCPA),239 which the Fed has interpreted as a “directive . . . to tailor 
oversight of institutions to ensure that [its] regulations match the character of 
the firms [it] regulate[s].”240 
These tailoring efforts include pulling back on some of the supervisory 
discretion that bank examiners have previously enjoyed. However, it is also 
clear, including from the language of EGRRCPA itself, that Congress has done 
nothing to curtail the use of discretion in supervision. A rule of construction 
adopted by Congress for that Act includes the instruction that nothing in the 
statute “shall be construed to limit . . . the supervisory, regulatory, or 
enforcement authority of an appropriate Federal banking agency to further the 
safe and sound operation of an institution under the supervision of the 
appropriate Federal banking agency.”241 Even as the predominant supervisory 
ethos drifts away from the exercise of discretion, the legal authority permitting 
discretion remains. 
 
237. See Julie Andersen Hill, When Bank Examiners Get It Wrong: Financial Institution 
Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1101, 1107 (2015). 
238. Margaret Tahyar, a banking lawyer and expert at Davis Polk & Wardwell, has testified 
recently before Congress to that effect. Tahyar’s argument is that, first, “one of the after effects of the 
Financial Crisis has been a vast expansion in the nature of supervision and its zone of secrecy and 
discretion” and second, that such discretion should be substantially curtailed.” Tahyar, supra note 231, 
at 5. 
239. Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018) (codified at scattered sections of 12, 15, 20, 
38, 42, 50 U.S.C.). 
240. Randal Quarles, Vice Chair for Supervision, Supervision and Regulation Report, 
Testimony Before Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, FED. RESERVE (May 15, 2019),  
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/files/quarles20190515a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DJZ4-NQ9E] 
241. 12 U.S.C. § 1831bb(e) (2018). For more on the supervision-enhancing aspects of federal 
banking law, including EGRRCPA, see Conti-Brown & Vanatta, supra note 213. 
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2. Supervisory Authority of Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
(SIFIs) and Systematically Important Financial Market Utilities 
(SIFMUs) 
Beyond designating the Fed as supervisor of bank holding companies, 
Congress has also given the Fed a great deal of authority over the regulation 
and supervision of systemic risk. This authority includes “enhanced supervision 
and prudential standards” for financial institutions and financial market utilities 
(such as payment, clearing, and settlement systems) deemed to be systemically 
important.242 This authority over the so-called SIFIs and SIFMUs allows for 
further emphasis on faster payments as part of the Fed’s supervisory strategy. 
By statute, the Fed must consider a variety of factors when implementing 
enhanced prudential standards, but the motivating framework comes from 
Congress’s desire to “prevent or mitigate risks to the financial stability of the 
United States that could arise from the material financial distress or failure, or 
ongoing activities, of large, interconnected financial institutions.”243 The 
emphasized section of the statute—the risks to the financial stability of the 
United States through “ongoing activities”—is the crucial hook for promoting 
faster payments. Because the current practice of using deferred net settlement 
on transactions necessarily entails risk-taking in a way that real-time gross 
settlement does not, a transition to systems like RTP and FedNow would 
reduce institutional risk-taking. It would therefore be reasonable for the Fed to 
prod systemically important institutions to move away from deferred net 
settlement. Indeed, if the CAMELS+ factors militate in favor of faster 
payments for the mine run of supervised institutions, the case is only stronger 
for systemically important institutions. That is because Congress required 
enhanced prudential standards to be “more stringent than the standards and 
requirements applicable to nonbank financial companies and bank holding 
companies that do not present similar risks to the financial stability of the 
United States.”244 
3. Supervision of Technology Service Providers 
A third possibility for leveraging supervision to promote faster payments 
would involve the supervision of private payment-platform operators—namely, 
The Clearing House. As noted in Part I, The Clearing House is the primary 
private interbank operator in the United States.245 This company is in turn 
owned by the “largest commercial banks” in the United States. If the Fed 
 
242. Id. § 5365. 
243. Id. (emphasis added). 
244. Id. 
245. About Us, Our History, CLEARING HOUSE, 
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/about/history [https://perma.cc/S3W2-AQHC]. 
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wanted to turbo-charge adoption of faster payments, it could impose 
requirements on TCH or its members to make the transition.  
The potential hooks for doing so are twofold. First, although The Clearing 
House considers itself to be a “highly regulated” entity, the statutory hook for 
this regulation is not in the Federal Reserve Act or the Bank Holding Company 
Act, but the Bank Services Company Act of 1962, as amended: the statute 
“subject[s] to examination and regulation by the appropriate Federal banking 
agency” any “bank service company,” which includes the operators of payment 
systems.246 The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council has 
provided since 2004 for the examination of wholesale payment systems247 and 
since 2010 for retail systems.248 In each case, the supervisor maintains 
significant supervisory authority to direct these systems as appropriate for their 
individual risk profile. There is no legal restriction against the Fed using these 
FFIEC processes to promote more extensive and more efficient use of real-time 
settlement. 
Second, the Fed possesses supervisory authority over the consortium of 
banks who operate RTP by virtue of RTP’s institutional set-up. Specifically, 
RTP operates through a so-called “joint account” held at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. Joint accounts—“those where the rights and liabilities are 
shared among multiple depository institution account-holders”249—were not a 
formalized part of the Fed’s services until 2017. In that year, the Fed issued 
guidelines implicitly to enable RTP to set up shop.250 This convenience for 
RTP was not costless for the Fed. Rather, the Fed noted that the arrangement 
“may pose increasing risks to the overall payment system in light of the 
potential to operate on a 24/7/365 basis.”251 As a result of these potential risks, 
the Fed determined that all joint-account-based payment systems must be 
“subject to the jurisdiction of a federal banking agency with the authority to 
examine or inspect [them] and take supervisory actions” against them or their 
participants.252 Pursuant to this authority, the Fed could require the RTP joint 
accountholders to migrate more of their transactions to real-time payments. 
This would occur as a combination of rulemaking and supervision. Rulemaking 
would first clarify the scope of the Fed’s authority. Supervision would then 
 
246. 12 U.S.C. § 1867 (2018). 
247. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, WHOLESALE PAYMENT SYSTEMS, IT 
EXAMINATION HANDBOOK (July 2004), 
https://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/media/274899/ffiec_itbooklet_wholesalepaymentsystems.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U38H-VL55]. 
248. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, RETAIL PAYMENT SYSTEMS, IT EXAMINATION 
HANDBOOK (Apr. 2016), 
https://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/media/274860/ffiec_itbooklet_retailpaymentsystems.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/62VU-YTE4]. 
249. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Final Guidelines for Evaluating Joint 
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proceed under the Bank Services Company Act, under which the Fed may treat 
payment operators as “technology service providers.”253 
 
*  *  * 
The supervisory approach complements the fiscal agency approach, but it 
has advantages and disadvantages. One the one hand, the supervisory approach 
enables greater effectiveness and precision in forcing private-sector actors to 
innovate. After all, the Fed would be coercing the adoption of faster payments. 
By contrast, the fiscal agency approach only provides incentives. These are 
nontrivial: to clear the $2 trillion of government payments and to earn the fees 
associated with those transactions. But if banks are content to stay wedded to 
non-real-time systems, those incentives will not carry the day. Supervisory 
strategies would do so more effectively. 
On the other hand, the cost of those strategies are the same coercive 
concerns that have motivated much recent discussion about how to “tailor” the 
Fed’s supervisory power—both within the Fed and in Congress. The use of the 
supervisory approach we lay out here would thus be much more audacious than 
the use of the fiscal agency power. 
C. The Power of Rewriting the Rules: Regulation 
There are two purely regulatory strategies that the Fed might also consider 
employing to facilitate and compel the private-sector adoption of real-time 
payments: making changes to the regulations governing who can become a 
“primary dealer” and changes under the Expedited Funds Availability Act. In 
the first case, congressional authorization is more remote, but the statutory 
discretion is larger; in the second case, congressional concern with payment 
speed is higher, but the statutory leeway is not available. 
1. The Regulation of Primary Dealers 
The Federal Reserve has, since its founding, acted through banks in 
financial markets to accomplish federal goals.254 Beginning in 1960, the Fed—
through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Markets Desk—started to 
use a select group of dealers to effect their open market operations.255 These are 
the so-called “primary dealers,” a group that today consists of twenty-four 
banks that perform a variety of roles for the Fed in exchange for exclusive 
 
253. Id. 
254. See 1 ALLAN MELTZER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: 1913-1951, at 
120-36 (2003). 
255. Louise Freeman, The Financing of Government Securities Dealers, 46 ECON. POL’Y 
REV., June 1964, at 115. 
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control over the Fed’s billions of dollars of open-market transactions.256 These 
include the obligation to, first, “participate consistently as counterparty to the 
New York Fed in its execution of open market operations” and, second, to 
“provide the New York Fed’s trading desk with market information and 
analysis helpful in the formulation of monetary policy.”257 This is a common 
feature of central banking throughout the world wherein primary dealers act as 
a “channel between the debt manager, the central bank, and investor in the 
primary market.”258 
The primary dealers are strictly regulated by the Fed.259 These regulations 
include the requirement to be a broker-dealer supervised by the SEC or a 
chartered bank subject to bank supervision, and to be adequately capitalized 
and subject to idiosyncratic capital supervision above and beyond what may be 
required by bank or securities regulators.260 Primary dealers must also conform 
to unspecified reputational requirements. No financial institution will receive 
the primary dealer designation if it “has been (within the last year) subject to 
litigation or regulatory action or investigation that the New York Fed 
determines material or otherwise relevant to the potential primary dealer 
relationship.”261 
During the financial crisis, one of the principal emergency-lending 
mechanisms throughout the entire financial system was the Primary Dealer 
Credit Facility, a program initiated under the Fed’s emergency lending 
authority under Section 13(3).262 The purpose of this lending facility was to 
provide a lender of last resort to primary dealers, including—and especially—
those without access to the Fed’s traditional discount window. This was the 
engine of lending throughout the financial crisis, with loans totaling almost $9 
trillion in total volume.263 
The statutory basis for the Fed’s control over primary dealers arises from 
two sources. First, section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act permits any Federal 
Reserve Bank “under rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of 
 
256. Administration of Relationships with Primary Dealers, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y., 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealers_policies.html [https://perma.cc/68C6-PVGD]. 
257. Id. 
258. Marco Arnone & George Iden, Primary Dealers in Government Securities: Policy Issues 
and Selected Countries’ Experience 7 (IMF, Working Paper No. 03/45, 2003), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp0345.pdf [https://perma.cc/GBD5-RCN7] (providing a 
skeptical overview of the Fed’s primary dealer regulations). 
259. Id. 
260. Administration of Relationships with Primary Dealers, supra note 256 (“The New York 
Fed may impose a higher capital requirement as circumstances, in its judgment, warrant.”). 
261. Id. 
262. For an overview of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, see Tobias Adrian, Christopher R. 
Burke & James J. McAndrews, The Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility, FED. RESERVE 
BANK OF N.Y., CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN., Aug. 2009. 
263. For data on the total transactions under the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, see Primary 
Dealer Credit Facility, Transaction Data, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/reform-pdcf.htm [https://perma.cc/JW8K-LNUL]. 
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Governors,” to “purchase and sell in the open market, at home or abroad,” 
certain assets from virtually any counterparty.264 Second, the Primary Dealers 
Act of 1988 imposes some limitations on foreign financial institutions that 
participate as broker dealers if their home countries do not “accord to United 
States companies the same competitive opportunities” they accord home 
dealers in their primary government debt markets.265 In other words, besides 
restrictions on foreign financial institutions engaged in a trade war with the 
United States, the Fed has plenary control over the regulations it imposes over 
primary dealers. 
The Fed could immediately use this plenary authority to require that 
primary dealers clear transactions on a real-time payment system on any time 
frame they choose. The primary dealers might protest that the clearing of 
transactions in real time has little to do with their status in making markets in 
government securities, but the Fed’s own regulations and recent history make 
clear that these regulations are far-reaching. Regardless, section 14 (as limited 
by the Primary Dealers Act) does not require that the Fed’s regulations be 
limited in any way except for concerns about foreign competition. More than 
perhaps any other mechanism currently at its disposal, forcing primary dealers 
to adopt real-time payments would revolutionize their adoption in the private 
sector. 
2. Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987 
The Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987 was passed to respond to 
the problem of banks placing holds on deposited checks for days and even 
weeks before funds were available for withdrawal.266 The principal issue was 
not bankers’ desire to make money on the float, but to ensure that they would 
not be on the hook for checks that were returned, or “dishonored.”267 Initially, 
the Fed attempted a regulatory fix to these problems by accelerating the return 
process,268 but Congress passed the Expedited Funds Availability Act in 1987 
to put more teeth behind a mandatory availability schedule that went beyond 
the Fed’s own regulatory efforts. 
 
264. 12 U.S.C. § 353 (2018). 
265. 22 U.S.C. § 5342 (2018). This requirement arose in 1988 during trade conflicts with 
Japan. For an excellent overview of the Primary Dealers Act of 1988, see Alexandra Scraggs, What Is a 
Primary Dealer? Updated, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2016), 
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/11/22/2179756/what-is-a-primary-dealer [https://perma.cc/TY38-
PWWV]. 
266. For an elegant discussion of how the Expedited Funds Availability Act pushed forward 
the federalization of finance, see Edward L. Rubin, Uniformity, Regulation, and the Federalization of 
State Law: Some Lessons from the Payment System, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251 (1989). 
267. Expedited Funds Availability Act: Hearings on H.R. 5301 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. 
Insts. Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. & Urban Affairs, 98th 
Cong. 193 (1984) (statement of Preston Martin). 
268. See 12 C.F.R. § 210.12(c) (1988). 
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A mandatory upper limit for the availability of funds is the centerpiece of 
the Act.269 Section 4002 introduces the different kinds of payments that are 
subject to its authority. Subsection 4002(a) requires a settlement upper limit on 
delays of availability for both “cash deposits” and “wire transfers” such that 
they be “available for withdrawal not later than the business day after the 
business day on which such cash is deposited or such funds are received.”270 
Subsections 4002(b) and (c) deal with the clearing of checks on a mandated 
schedule. Subsection 4002(e) deals with the clearing of funds through ATMs. 
Aaron Klein, one of the primary advocates for the Fed’s adoption of real-
time payments, sees the legal authority granted to the Fed under the Act as the 
key to its implementation.271 Klein cites § 4002(d), which instructs the Fed 
(and the other relevant banking regulators) to use regulation to: 
 
reduce the time periods established under subsections (b), (c), and (e) to as short 
a time as possible and equal to the period of time achievable under the improved 
check clearing system for a receiving depository institution to reasonably expect 
to learn of the nonpayment of most items for each category of checks.272 
 
Klein cites the congressional charge to “reduce the time periods . . . to as short 
a time as possible” as the legal basis for facilitating real-time payments.273 
To assess the claim that § 4002(d) specifically provides or that the 
Expedited Funds Availability Act generally provides this authority, we must 
first answer two legal questions: First, what are the funds that would be most 
likely cleared in real time? And second, does the “as short a time as possible” 
provision apply to those funds? 
Congress defined several of the key terms to which § 4002 applies. Cash 
refers to U.S. coins and currency, which are not applicable to a real-time 
payment system.274 Checks are “any negotiable demand draft drawn on or 
payable through an office of a depository institution located in the U.S.,” 
excluding “noncash items.”275 Both “wire funds” and “noncash items” are, as 
relevant here, left to the Fed to define.276 
This tedious exercise in legal definition is important because the key 
instruction to “reduce . . . to as short a time as possible” refers only to those 
transactions that involve checks and ATMs—they exclude “wire transfers” and 
“noncash items.” As a result, the statute cannot be read to require the Fed to 
adopt real-time payments beyond what is necessary for banks to ensure that 
 
269. 12 U.S.C. § 4002 (2018). 
270. Id. 
271. Klein, supra note 72. 
272. 12 U.S.C. § 4002(d). 
273. Id. 
274. 12 U.S.C. § 4001(4) (2018). 
275. Id. § 4001(7). 
276. Id. § 4001(14), (25). 
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checks are not to be returned for nonpayment, a proviso that appears to prevent 
instantaneous settlement. 
Even if § 4002(d) cannot be used to force the adoption of real-time 
payments, the Act still instructs depository institutions to clear “wire 
transfers”—however the Fed will choose to define them—no later than a 
business day after the business day that such funds are received.277 That pace is 
precisely the time frame that exposes those at the economic margin to the 
greatest insecurity, as discussed in Part I. The question, then, is whether there is 
a statutory hook the Fed could use to push banks to move more quickly than 
this. 
Unlike other grants of statutory authority where the discretion is 
essentially untrammeled, as in the statutes cited above in Section III.B, the 
Expedited Funds Availability Act is much more circumscribed. The Act is 
directed, by and large, at the banks, not the Fed. Any legislative maneuver 
whereby the Fed instructed the depository institutions to move more quickly 
than the Act allowed would permit the banks to argue that their slower clearing 
speed was permissible under the Act. 
For these reasons, we think the Expedited Funds Availability Act does not 
provide a strong statutory basis for the Fed’s real-time payments mandate. This 
is ironic: the Act is the most explicit congressional attempt in history to force 
banks to facilitate faster payments. Even so, the structure of the mandate and 
the explicit ambit of its text prevents the muscular reading that would support a 
blanket Fed mandate for real-time payments. 
*  *  * 
FedNow will likely represent the future of real-time payments at the Fed, 
but the Fed’s explicit hope is to foster private innovation in payments, not to 
displace it.278 Whether or not that interest is sincere, this Part has discussed the 
steps the Fed can—and cannot—take to begin using its extraordinary powers as 
an operator, supervisor, and regulator to incentivize and compel the adoption of 
real-time payments in the private sector immediately. And unlike the five-year 
plan for adopting its own payment rail, these steps could be taken immediately, 
to great effect for those who are disadvantaged by the ongoing slow structure 
of settlements in the United States. 
Conclusion 
The time to facilitate faster payments in the United States has come, and 
this Article has argued that the Fed possesses an array of tools at its disposal to 
do so. One—the ability to operate public options in the interbank payment 
market—has been employed to great effect in the past but has not been a site of 
 
277. Id. § 4001(25). 
278. Federal Reserve Actions to Support Interbank Settlement of Faster Payments, Notice and 
Request for Comment, 84 Fed. Reg. 39297, 39299 (Aug. 9, 2019). 
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transformative innovation in decades. Others—the market-participant, 
supervisory, and regulatory tools we canvassed in Part IV—largely have been 
overlooked by the Fed in its efforts to promote payment-system development. 
In examining these tools, we have aimed to correct two misperceptions. First, 
contrary to critics, the FedNow public option is entirely consistent with the 
statutory scheme that governs Fed payment-system efforts. Second, contrary to 
the Fed itself, the public option hardly represents the be-all-end-all of Fed 
leadership. Rather, the Fed possesses an array of complementary tools owing to 
its hybrid, public-private institutional structure. 
Our account of the Fed’s authority opens up a range of questions 
regarding how best to use make use of it. These questions are not primarily 
legal in nature: whether or not the Fed makes energetic, effective use of its 
available tools depends on a host of factors that operate at the levels of politics, 
interest groups, institutions, and even technology. No legal change has dictated 
that the United States become a payment-system laggard; no legal change is 
needed to catch back up. But a deeper perspective on the legal details of the 
Fed’s payment-system involvement nevertheless may enable Fed personnel to 
see themselves and their work in a new light. Far from being merely a source of 
controversy and complexity, the Fed’s hybrid structure provides it with the 
authority to work with the private sector in realizing the possibilities of faster 
payments. Those possibilities do not depend on Congress to pass new law or on 
the hope for technological breakthroughs, but rather on bureaucratic will. 
 
